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INTRODUCTION

Missouri Judge Barbara T. Peebles had served as an assistant city
counselor, a prosecutor, and the First Commissioner of the St. Louis Drug
Court when, in September 2000, Governor Mel Carnahan appointed her to
the bench as an Associate Judge to the Twenty-Second Judicial Circuit
Court, a district that includes St. Louis city. 1 Supporters and later
detractors alike agree that Judge Peebles is a thoughtful and fair judge;2 and
I. The circuit court is Missouri's general jurisdiction court. The Court of
Appeals is the intermediate appellate court that handles all appeals from the circuits
except for those appeals that are exclusive to the Supreme Court. The Missouri
Supreme Court is the highest court and court of last result. See 2 THE AMERICAN
BENCH: JUDGES OF THE NATION 1604 (Jason Davila et al. ed. 2013) [hereinafter 2 THE
AMERICAN BENCH]; YOUR MISSOURI COURTS, http://www.courts.mo.gov (last visited
May 16, 2014) [hereinafter YOUR MISSOURI COURTS].
2. See Athena Mutua, Seeking Justice in Missouri: The Case of the Honorable
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for most of her career, she seems to have enjoyed a fine reputation. For
instance, no one in the Judge's entire legal career had ever filed a
complaint against her, ethical or otherwise.3 In fact, colleagues had
suggested that she consider applying for elevation to the position of circuit
judge or to other federal judicial positions; endeavors the Judge had begun
to pursue. 4 Overall, she appeared to have a promising future.
However, Judge Peebles life changed on Good Friday 2013,5 when the
Supreme Court of Missouri found that she had engaged in misconduct and
suspended her from the circuit court bench for six months6-one of the
longest suspensions meted out to a Missouri judge in recent history.7 Some
suggested that the timing of the decision, Good Friday, was political and
meant to stifle any legislative action that might use the outcome of the case
as an opportunity to challenge the vaunted Missouri Nonpartisan Court
Plan. 8 The Plan was the first merit-based judicial selection plan passed in
the United States,9 and it has been under attack for several years. 10 The
Barbara T. Peebles, in BUFFALO LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER SERIES I, 5-6
(2012) [hereinafter Seeking Justice]. See also Transcript from Mo. Comm'n on
Discipline Hearing at 86, In re Peebles, No. SC9281 I (Mo. March 29, 2013) (on file
with author) (presenting the testimony of Judge Ohmer, a witness for the prosecution,
who noted that lawyers were complimentary of Judge Peebles' knowledge of the law
and her rulings in court and explaining that Judges have some latitude as to when they
schedule their dockets and how they run their courts).
3. See Robert Patrick, St. Louis Judge Suspended After She Turns Cases Over to
Her Clerk, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH (Sept. I, 2012, 10:00 AM),
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/st-louis-judge-suspended-after
she-tums-cases-over-to/articlc eb963044-f382-I I e l-afec-00 I a4bcf6878.html. See also
Seeking Justice, supra note 2, at I.
4. As an associate judge, Judge Peebles had applied for elevation to a circuit
court judge on her own bench and for a federal magistrate judge position.
5. Order, In re Peebles, No. SC9281 l (Mo. March 29, 2013), available at
http://jurispage.com/2013/law-practice-management/the-best-law-firm-case
management-software-an-in-depth-comparison/.
6. Id.
7. See Heather Cole, Special Report: Missouri System for Judges Emphasizes
Privacy Over Accountability, Mo. LAWS. MEDIA (Dec. 11, 2011).
8. See Valerie Schremp Hahn, Missouri Supreme Court Suspends St. Louis Judge
for 6 Months Without Pay, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Mar. 30, 2012, 12:00 AM),
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/mo-supreme-court-suspends-st
louis-judge-for-months-without/article_bfe30828-d654-59bd-8c85-b6cd2edc4tb9.htm1
(noting that Courthouse rumors in St. Louis had long speculated that the court would
decline to follow the commission's recommendation to remove Peebles and that the
high court would time its announcement for a day when the legislature was out of
session to minimize any repercussions).
9. Judicial Selection in the States: Missouri, AM. JUDICATURE Soc'Y,
http://www.judicialselection.com/j udicial_selection/index.cfm?state=MO (last visited
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11

Missouri Supreme Court based its decision on oral arguments, parties'
12
briefs, and the hearing transcript and report by the Missouri Commission
13
on Retirement, Removal and Discipline ("the Commission"),
which
argued the case. In their report, the Commission had recommended that the
judge be removed because it found that she had abdicated her duties to her
clerk while on vacation in China, destroyed a court document, was late to
work, lacked credibility during the investigation, and admittedly had made
.
14
comments to a newspaper about a pendmg case.
However, upon further scrutiny, the litany of charges and findings
15
The
seemed to grow, in large part, out of a conflict with another judge.
conflict involved a male judge who insisted that Judge Peebles decide court
16
cases, particularly bond cases, in the way that he thought fit. She refused
17
to follow his instructions. This judge and his supporters responded to her
refusal with harassment, interference with her court, and an ethics case for
18
misconduct lodged before the Commission.s
The ethics case took
May 16, 2014).
I0. See Hahn, supra note 8.
11. In re The Matter of the Honorable Barbara T. Peebles, DOCKET SUMMARIES
SUPREME
CT.
Mo.
(Jan.
3,
2013),
http://www.courts.mo.gov/sup/index.nsf/9f4cd5a463e4c22386256ac4004a490f/52022b
5791 be426e86257ab7006434ea?OpenDocument [hereinafter DOCKET SUMMARIES].
12. Id.
13. See generally Commission Report on Barbara T. Peebles, ST. LOUIS POST
DISPATCH (Aug. 31, 2012, 5:05 PM), http://www.stltoday.com/commission-report-on
barbara-t-peebles/pdf_fe28ac3e-f3b7-l l e l -baca-001a4bcf6878.htm
[hereinafter
Comm 'n Report].
14. See id. at 17, 19, 21-25.
15. See Seeking Justice, supra note 2, at 3-4, 13-14.
16. Id. at 11-12. See also Valerie Schremp Hahn, St. Louis Judges Say Higher
Bonds May Help Curb Gun Violence, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH {June 4, 201 I, 12:05
AM),
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/st-louis-j udges-say
higher-bonds-may-hel p-curb-gun/ article_3 l e4ec8a-64bb-5e I5-bd62825a87ea84d9.html [hereinafter Curb Gun Violence] (describing the justification for
higher bail); Jennifer Mann, Debate Over St. Louis Gun Crime Bail Flares Anew, ST
LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH
{Sept.
27,
2012,
4:00
PM),
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/debate-over-st-louis-gun-crime
bail-flares-anew/article_2c064561-l d04-55 l 8-9cad-322ce973ad95.html (describing the
origin of the program and public review of it); Gary J. Lauber, St. Louis City Judges
Raise Bail in Gun Cases and St. Louis City Homicides Drop, Mo. CRIM. LAws. BLOG
15,
(Feb.
2012),
http://web.archive.org/web/20120707090400/http://www.missouricriminallawyersblog.
com/ (describing the policy and criminal lawyers dissatisfaction with it).
17. See Seeking Justice, supra note 2, at 11-12 (discussing the bail bond issue).
18. See id. at 11-14, I5-16 (discussing the bail bond issue, and a pattern of
harassment, concluding that the White judges took offense in part because they
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advantage of a miscalculation on the judge's part and centered around the
fact that the judge allowed her clerks to make the first call on court
announcements. 19 From a public perspective, her vacation tour to China
served as the catalyst for the case, during which time her clerks, allegedly
inappropriately, continued to manage her court.20
At roughly the same time, hundreds of miles away in Seattle, presiding
municipal court judge Edsonya Charles, appointed by former Mayor Greg
Nickels in 2004, fought for and eventually lost her bid to retain her judicial
commission.21 According to news accounts, "City Council members, the
city attorney and a group of DUI lawyers"22 - the latter of whom comprised
believed she, as a Black woman, was supposed to follow their instructions).
19. See id. at 6-7; Comm'n Report, supra note 13, at 5-6, 9-15, 21-22 (discussing
this practice and charging and finding it a violation of various court rules, canons, and
the Missouri Constitution).
20. See Comm'n Report, supra note 13, at 13- I4. See also, e.g., Robert Patrick,
Clerks Ran Court While a St. Louis Judge Was on Vacation Overseas, ST. LOUIS POST
DISPATCH (Dec. 18, 201 I, 2:30 PM), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and
courts/clerks-ran-court-while-a-st-louis-judge-was-on/articIe_c628a6c5-46d9-5c5e9b2d-afl e45dc2a28 .html [hereinafter Clerks Ran Court]; Robert Patrick, St. Louis
Judge's China Trip Has Her in Hot Water, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (June 8, 2012,
12:30 AM), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/metro/st-louis-judge-s-china-trip-has
her-in-hot/article_8901d72c- I 3a7-55cc-849b- I l 0976239e86.html [hereinafter Hot
Water]; Patrick, supra note 3, at 1-2; Robert Patrick, Group Rallies to Support
Suspended St. Louis Judge, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Sept. 15, 201 2),
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/group-ral1ies-to-support
suspended-st-louis-judge/article_cd57fl 66-fe96- l l e l-835f-OO1a4bcf6878.html
[hereinafter Support Suspended St. Louis Judge].
21. See Emily Heffter, Presiding Judge of Seattle Municipal Court Targeted for
Defeat,
SEATTLE
TIMES
(Oct.
5,
2010,
10:00
PM),
http://www.seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2013082641 _municourt06.html
[hereinafter Targeted for Defeat] (discussing opposition to Judge Charles' reelection
bid in 2010 and noting that "[m]unicipal court judges, who handle drunken-driving
cases, assault charges, drug offenses and other minor crimes, don't often face
challengers"); Nina Shapiro, Edsonya Charles, Muni Court Judge in Heated Reelection
Race, Gets Unconvincing Rebuke From King County Bar Association, SEATTLE WKLY.
(Oct. 28 2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.seattleweekly.com/home/932223l 29/campaign20 l 0 (discussing Charles' opponents and noting that her claims that her
opponent may be "inappropriately and even illegally involved with a political action
committee (PAC) made up largely of DUI defense attorneys, called Citizens for
Judicial Excellence"); Edsonya Charles, Seattle Municipal Court: Position One,
(Nov.
2,
VOTINGFORJUDGES.ORG
2010),
http://www.votingforjudges.org/1Ogen/div1 /king/sea1ec.html; Kathy Best, Judge
Edsonya Charles Losing Seattle Court Race, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 2, 2010, 9:42 PM),
http://seattletimes.com/html/politicsnorthwest/2013329398judge_edsonya_eharle
s_losing_s.html (discussing the election that Charles lost).
22. See Heffter, Targeted for Defeat, supra note 21; Shapiro, supra note 21
(discussing the charges of inappropriate affiliation with PAC).
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a large segment of a political action committee ("PAC") that put $74,000
behind her opponent's campaign - sought her ouster.23 Charles argued the
affiliation between her opponent and the PAC was problematic and
threatened the justice system because her opponent was or would be
4
beholden to the DUI lawyers.2 Her supporters seemed to agree, including
the mayor, who suggested that the DUI attorneys targeted Judge Charles
because she did not render decisions to their liking.25 Others suggested that
the DUI attorneys were particularly piqued because the judge "wouldn't let
private attorneys jump 'to the head of the line' and have their cases heard
before public defenders."26 But opponents, particularly some City Council
members, argued that Judge Charles was uncooperative, confrontational,
and particularly unhelpful around efforts to reduce the municipal court 's
budget.27 Judge Charles was resoundingly defeated.28
Both Judges Peebles and Charles are women of color. Is this a
coincidence?
This article presents and analyzes preliminary empirical data indicating
that there are gender and racial disparities in state judicial misconduct
cases. The paper focuses on formal state judicial discipline processes,
rather than elections, and specifically asks: (1) Are women and judges of
color disproportionately disciplined; and (2) Do women and judges of color
face harsher sanctions in judicial disciplinary actions?
The latter question is currently the focus of a case in New Jersey.29 A
23. See Shapiro, supra note 21; Heffter, Targeted for Defeat, supra note 21; Emily
Heffter, DUI Lawyers Spend $74, 000 to Back Ed McKenna in Court Race, SEATTLE
PM),
TIMES
(Oct.
26,
2010,
10:12
http://seattletimes.com/html/politicsnorthwest/2013265809 _dui_attomeys_spend_7400
0_to_b.html [hereinafter DUI lawyers].
24. See Heffter, Targeted for Defeat, supra note 21; Shapiro, supra note 21.
25. See Emily Heffter, Former Mayor Nickels Offers Support to Charles in
Judicial
Race,
SEATTLE
TIMES
(Oct.
27,
2010,
2:42
PM),
http://seattletimes.com/html/politicsnorthwest/2013275543_former_mayor_greg_nickel
s_weig.html [hereinafter Nickels Offers Support]; Charles, supra note 21 (recalling the
mayor noting in his email flyer: "Edsonya is facing an orchestrated and well-funded
attack led by a small but well-funded special interest group of laWYers who practice in
Muni Court.").
26. See McKenna Elected, SQ ATTORNEYS BLOG (Nov. 6, 2010),
http://sqattomeys.com/blog/?tag=seattle-dui-attomeys; Chris Grygiel, Candidate
Backed by DUI lawyers Ousts Seattle Judge, SEATTLEPI (Nov. 2, 2010),
http:/lblog.seattlepi.com/seattlepolitics/2010/ I I/02/candidate-backed-by-dui-lawyers
ousts-seattle-judge/.
27. See Heffler, Targeted/or Defeat, supra note 21.
28. See generally Best, supra note 21.
29. See generally Def. Summation at 2-3, In re Campbell, No. ACJC 2008-317
(N.J. Sup. Ct. Dec. 30, 2009).
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Black male judge was publicly reprimanded for having a romantic
relationship with another court employee.30 Though New Jersey judiciary
policy states that consensual dating relationships between court employees
are not the judiciary's business, the policy nevertheless requires that the
Court be informed about such relationships, 3 1 especially where the
employee has been a subordinate of the judge, as was determined in this
case. 32 Judge Wilson Campbell claims that he was more harshly
disciplined than a White judge found guilty of the same misconduct.33 He
alleged that he was treated differently not only because he is Black, but
also because he is a single Black man.34 Regarding the latter claim, Judge
Campbell suggests that he was treated more harshly than judges who dated
and then married subordinate court staff, as well as married judges who
engaged in extra marital romantic relations with court staff. 35
This paper is part of a larger project and companion paper prepared for
the conference on the book entitled, Presumed Incompetent: The
Intersections of Race and Class for Women in A cademia, but with a focus
on judges.36 The companion paper explores the Missouri disciplinary
action discussed above as an example of the ways in which bias,
stereotypes, and White privilege, as well as institutionalized gender and
racial oppression affect the professional lives of women of color. 37 Studies
30. Id. at 2.
3 1 . Id. at 3-5.
32. In re Campbell, 205 N.J. 2 (2011) (ordering that Campbell, a former municipal
judge be publically reprimanded for failure to report a consensual relationship with a
subordinate court employee based on a complaint brought by the Advisory Committee
on Judicial Conduct).
33. See Martin Bricketto, Ex-Sedgwick Attorney Ends Suit Over Firing for Baliff
Romance,
LAW360.COM
{July
9,
2013,
5:16
PM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/455835/ex-sedgwick-atty-ends-suit-over-firing-for
bailiff-romance. See also Def. Summation, supra note 29, at 8 (noting that "Judge
Campbell is not the first member of the judiciary to have become involved in a
relationship with another judiciary employee, but he is the first to receive an ethics
complaint for such a relationship. . . ").
34. Def. Summation, supra note 29 at 8. See also, Campbell v. Supreme Court of
NJ., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41650, 2012 WL 1033308 (D.N.J. Mar. 27, 2012) (on a
motion to dismiss, Campbell's claim for discrimination based on race is allowed to go
forward while his claim for discrimination on the basis of gender and marital status is
dismissed, among other claims).
35. Complaint at 20, Campbell v. Supreme Court of NJ., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
41650 (D.N.J. Mar. 27, 2012) (asserting that the opposing party was aware ofsa number
of intimate relations between court employees in which one person held supervisory
power and yet these were not charged with ethical violations).
36. PRESUMED INCOMPETENT {Gabriella Gutierrez y Muhs, et al. ed. 2012).
37. See Zeus Leonardo, The Color of Supremacy: Beyond the Discourse of White
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of demographic disparities in the context of judicial discipline do not exist.
This paper presents a first look at the raw data associated with this issue,
which was assembled into a database.38
Part I of this paper briefly chronicles the difficulty encountered in trying
to access the pertinent data. Part II provides a brief overview of state
judicial selection and disciplinary systems, which in varying measures are
meant to promote judicial independence, accountability, quality and
diversity. Part III of the paper provides the findings on the demographic
composition of the state bench and describes the method my researchers
and I used in assembling the data. Part IV turns to the data on disciplinary
cases broken down by gender and race (j udges of color as compared to
White judges) as they relate to the overall composition of the bench. Here
particular attention is paid to the incidence of judicial removals - the
harshest sanction a judge may face for misconduct. Part V delves deeper
into the distribution of sanctions parsed out by groups and makes some
observations about the number of charges and types of conduct that impact
the determination of sanctions. These might aid in explaining the
disparities. Part VI summarizes the study's findings and observations.
Finally, Part VII concludes the paper with some personal thoughts on the
project.
I. COLORBLIND DIVERSITY
Colorblind diversity may simply be an oxymoron. How can one be
committed to diversity, particularly racial and gender diversity, but be blind
to race and gender? The concept of diversity, itself, as many critics have
noted, is deeply problematic as currently conceptualized because it
disconnects diversity from historical racial and gender injustice, among
other things. 39 In addition, in practice, few of the many who pledge loyalty
Privilege, 36 EDUC. PHIL. & THEORY 1 37, 1 43 (2004) (arguing that if white supremacy

and racism were simply an artifact of the past, then it would not be as formidable
today).
38. The study provides a statistical analysis by race and gender of cases relating to
disciplined judges. As in the California study, "the data do not permit conclusions to
be drawn regarding causation . . . but reveal the trends and relationships." California
Summary ofDiscipline Statistics 1 990-2009, infra note 1 95. Consequently, I leave it to
others to perform other analyses and evaluations. In this vein, I hope to share the
database with interested others.
39. See e.g., Derrick Bell, Diversity's Distractions, 1 03 COLUM. L. REV. 1 622
(2003); Athena D. Mutua, et al., Symposium: Who Gets In? The Quest for Diversity
after Grutter, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 53 1 (2004); Charlotte Garden & Nancy Leong, "So
Closely Intertwineds": labor and Racial Solidarity, 8 1 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 1 35
(20 1 3); Osamudia R. James, White like Me: The Negative Impact of the Diversity
Rationale On White Identity Formation, 89 MIAMI LAW RESEARCH PAPER SERIES 1 0 1
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to the idea, seem committed to doing the hard work of reorganizing social
and institutional priorities to ensure diversity or even to tracking any
potential progress where changes have been made. This is certainly the
case in the context of "diversifying the judiciary," particularly among the
state judicial benches. There is some work geared toward increasing the
number of women and people of color on the bench by, for instance,
promoting judicial selection methods that yield higher numbers of
individuals from these groups.40 There is also some work tracking these
methods in this regard.4 1 However, there is no work, of which I am aware,
tracking the ways by which judges of color may be disproportionally
leaving the bench. The lack of data collection and analysis in this area may
be compounded by the strongly emerging and problematic norm of
colorblindness, as it counsels that seeing "race," in particular, is
·
·
mappropnate. 42
Studies of gender and racial disparities in the context of state judicial
discipline do not exist. Information about judicial disciplinary actions
across all fifty states, however, is available and maintained by the
American Judicature Society ("AJS") in the form of case summaries.43
These summaries can be accessed in full for the price of membership in its
Judicial Ethics Center and are organized by type of misconduct.44 While
the summaries do not provide the racial, ethnic or gender status of the
judges disciplined, they do provide the state where a reported judge
presides, and often an official case cite, if one exists. The database that this
paper relies upon draws on state judges disciplined from 2002 to 2012, a
total of 1,263 cases, as reported by AJS.
(2014) (discussing the way in which the diversity rationale reinforces a sense of
superiority in Whites and, fosters a belief in individuality, thereby promoting ignorance
of the context of racial and gender systems and structures of privilege and disadvantage
that shape peoples' lives).
40. See infra note 128-138 and accompanying text (discussing the merit system for
selecting judges as possibly improving both the quality and diversity of judges).
41. Id. See also infra notes 109-115 and accompanying text (discussing the value
of judicial diversity).
42. See infra notes 79-94 and accompanying text (discussing the problems with
the concept and strategic use of colorblindness).
43. Center
for
Judicial
Ethics,
AM.
JUDICATURE
Soc'v,
https://www.ajs.org/index.php/judicial-ethics/information-service (last visited May 16,
201 4). Access to the full Judicial Discipline Decision Summaries database is by
membership only. A copy of the database from 2001 to March 2014 is on file with
author. [Hereafter referred to as AJS Case Summaries Database]. But see, Judicial
Conduct
Reporter,
AM.
JUDICATURE
SOC'Y,
https://www.ajs.org/index.php/judicial-ethics/judicial-conduct-reporter (last visited
May 16, 201 4)
44. AJS Case Summaries Database, supra note 43.
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There is also reasonably accessible information, much of it proprietary,
which provides the names and credentials of state judges across the
nation.45 However, little of this information provides the gender and racial
status of these individuals. Information on the federal bench is the glaring
exception. The names of those judges who sit on the federal bench can be
easily accessed online.46 The online database not only provides whole
numbers of those on the bench, but provides and is searchable by the
gender and racial status of the judges.47 When I attempted to compile the
information for a database on the state bench, including the names, racial
and gender status of judges, for the purpose of identifying any disparities, I
encountered two crucial problems. First, as previously suggested, the
information on state judges' racial and gender status was not readily
available.48 This was particularly problematic as most judicial disciplinary
proceedings occur at the state level. 49 Second, there appeared to be some
resistance to the very questions being posed. These included questions
about the demographic composition of the state bench; questions about the
racial, ethnic, and gender status of judges; and, questions about whether
racial and gender disparities exist among those subject to misconduct
proceedings and in the sanctions imposed.50
Both problems are curious.
A. Farce: Data and Diversity
One would think that finding the demographic data to answer the
questions posed in this paper would be relatively easy to find and readily
available. After all, beginning in the late 1980s, many states commissioned

45. See e. g., Judicial Conduct Reporter, supra note 43; The American Bench 2014
FORSTER-LONG.COM,
http://www.forster
Now
Available,
long.com/americanbench.asp (last visited May 1 6, 20 1 4) [hereinafter American Bench

Edition

Available].
46. History

of
the
Federal
Judiciary,
FED.
JUD.
CTR.,
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/researchcategories.html (last visited May 1 6,
20 1 4).
47. Id.
48. See infra note 50 (discussing the organizations we contacted in trying to
ascertain this information).
49. This would make sense as the state bench is comprised of over I 7,000 lawyers
while the federal bench is comprised of 3,000 to 4,000 lawyers.
50. My research assistants and I contacted multiple agencies, including: The Am.
Bar Ass'n, The American Judicature Soc'y, The Nat') Ass'n for Law Placement, The
Nat'l Ctr. for State Courts, The Nat') Judicial Coll., and The Brennan Ctr. for Justice.
We also contacted a number of judicial administration offices in a number of states,
such as Arizona, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, and Texas.
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taskforces to examine gender and/or racial bias in the justice system.5 1 One
of the many findings of these taskforces was that the judiciary lacked
diversity, and as a consequence, public confidence in these systems, the
overall legitimacy of the judiciary and perhaps justice itself appeared to
suffer.52 Presumably, these studies relied on demographic data on the
judiciary, information crucial to these types of studies. State information
might well have been readily available for state taskforces, but associations
also reported nationally on the state of diversity in state courts.53
Further, most nationally legal-focused associations have a section or
committee charged with studying, and presumably promoting, issues of
diversity.54 Therefore, one would expect these organizations to have
information that tracked the ways in which the profession was becoming
more or less diverse.55 Moreover, much has been written about the impact
of the different judicial selection methods-election, governor appointed,
commission appointed judges- on diversity.t56 Thus, even if no one had
5 1 . See Gender and Racial Fairness State Links, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS,
http://www.ncsc.org/Topics/Access-and-Faimess/Gender-and-Racial-Faimess/State
Links.aspx (last visited May 1 6, 20 1 4) (including the following states: Alaska, Arizona,
California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and West Virginia). See
generally Lynn Hecht Schafran & Norma Juliet W ikler, Gender Fairness in the Courts:
Action in the New Millennium, THE GENDER FAIRNESS STRATEGY PROJECT, available at
http://womenlaw.stanford.edu/pdf/genderfaimess-strategiesproject.pdf.
52. See LAWYERS COMM. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW, ANSWERING THE CALL
FOR A MORE DIVERSE JUDICIARY: A REVIEW OF STATE JUDICIAL SELECTION METHODS
AND THEIR IMPACT ON CREATING A MORE DIVERSE JUDICIARY 5 (2005), available at
http://www.lawyerscommittee.org/admin/public_policy/documents/files/more_diverse_
judiciary.pd[ [hereinafter LAWYERS COMM.].
53. Gender and Racial Fairness: State Links, supra note 5 1 .
54. AM.
BAR
Ass'N,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/centers_commissions.html (last visited May 1 6,
20 1 4); AM. JUDICATURE Soc'Y, https://www.ajs.org/ (last visited May 1 9, 20 1 4);
NAT'L CTR. ST. CTS., http://www.ncsc.org/Topics/Access-and-Faimess/Gender-and
Racial-Faimess/Resource-Guide.aspx (last visited June I, 201 4); Legal Momentum,
THE
WOMEN'S
LEGAL
DEFENSE
AND
EDUCATION
FUND,
https://www. legalmomentum.org (last visited June 1 0, 20 1 4).
55. NAT'L
CTR.
ST.
CTS.,
http://www.ncsc.org/Topics/Access-andFaimess/Gender-and-Racial-Faimess/Resource-Guide.aspx (last visited June I , 20 1 4).
56. See, e.g. , MALIA REDDICK, MICHAEL J. NELSON, & RACHAEL PAINE
CAULFIELD, EXAMINING DIVERSITY ON STATE COURTS: How DOES THE JUDICIAL
SELECTION ENVIRONMENT ADVANCE-AND INH IBIT-JUDICIAL DIVERSITY? I (Am.
Judicature Soc'y, 20 1 0; Linda M. Merola & Jon B. Gould, Navigating Judicial

Selection: New Judges Speak About the Process and its Impact on Judicial Diversity,
93 JUDICATURE 1 84, 1 84 (20 1 0).
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focused directly on diversity and j udicial misconduct, one would expect the
data on women and people of color in the j udiciary to be available.
This, however, is not the case, at least not for state j udges. Forster Inc. ,
the publisher o f the American Bench directory, provides biographical
information on both federal and state j udges. Since 2006, this directory has
included a gender report, but the directory does not include a separate list
5
of women j udges. 7 The directory also does not provide a report on racial or
ethnic progress in the j udiciary or provide racial status information on
j udges. National racial data, at the level of the state benches is only
58
Recently, however, the
episodically available and then is incomplete.
ABA has undertaken an endeavor to provide the racial and gender status on
59
But
all state j udges. It expects to go online with such data within a year.
at this juncture, diversity and data on diversity on the state bench is by half
60
measure a farce.

B. Charade: Colorblind Resistance
While data issues complicated the construction of the database used in
this study and shaped some of its limitations, one other factor frustrated the
completion of the database upon which this paper relies: Resistance by
57. See I THE AM ERICAN B ENCH: JUDGES OF THE NATION (Jason Davila et al. ed.
20 1 3) [hereinafter I THE AMERICAN BENCH].
58. See generally AM. BAR ASS'N 200 1 JD STANDING COMM. ON MINORITIES IN
THE JUDICIARY, THE DIRECTORY OF MINORITY JUDGES OF THE UNITED STATES (3d ed.
200 1 ) [hereinafter MINORITIES IN THE JUDICIARY (3d ed.)] ; AM. BAR Ass'N JUDICIAL
DIV. STANDING COMM. ON MINORITIES IN THE JUDICIARY, THE DIRECTORY OF
MINORITY JUDGES OF THE UNITED STATES (4th ed. 2008) [hereinafter MINORITIES IN
THE JUDICIARY (4th ed.)]; National Database on Judicial Diversity in State Courts, AM.
BAR Assoc. STANDING COMM. ON MINORITIES IN THE JUDICIARY,
http://apps.americanbar.org/abanet/jd/display/national.cfm (last visited May I 9, 20 1 4)
[hereinafter ABA Database on Judicial Diversity] (publishing national data on race in
the j udiciary irregularly, but updated as of 20 I 0).
59. Interview with Peter Koelling, Dir. & Chief Counsel, Am. Bar Ass'n & Shawn
Sanford, Am. Bar Ass'n (August 20 1 3) [hereinafter Interview].
60. "A farce is a broad satire or comedy, though now it's used to describe
something that is supposed to be serious but has turned ridiculous. If a defendant is not
treated fairly, his lawyer might say that the trial is a farce. As a type of comedy, a farce
uses improbable situations, physical humor and silliness to entertain . . .If a real-life
event or situation is a farce, it feels ridiculous. An election is a farce, if the outcome has
been determined before the voting begins. And class can feel like a farce if your
substitute teacher knows less about the subject than you do." DEFINITION OF FARCE,
http://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/farce (last visited July 7, 20 1 4); "A funny play
or movie about ridiculous situations and events, the style of humor that occurs in a
farce: something that is so bad that it is seen as ridiculous." DEFINITION OF FARCE,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/farce (last visited July 9, 20 14)
[Hereinafter FARCE, MERRIAM] .
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several of those who might have access to pieces of the data puzzle.6 1 This
resistance may have arisen because asking questions about the
demographics of the bench made it clear that there was little information in
a coherent and updated form held by some of those who presumably should
have had it; especially those that produce reports on diversity.62 Yet, it can
be conceded that this information is difficult to find.63 First, lawyers are
becoming judges all the time and any number of judges leave the bench
each year. Further, the judges themselves may or may not provide their
4
racial or gender status.6 Gender status may be readily inferable by name,
but there is no guarantee of the accuracy of the inference because some
names are more gender ambiguous.65 Race, what it means and how people
identify themselves may not be so obvious. Thus, where judges themselves
do not provide this information, the difficulty of assessing racial status is
greatly increased.
The resistance to the questions presented in this paper, however,
appeared to be about more than the difficulty arising from compiling this
information. The very nature of the questions seemed to rattle some
respondents. Some of those responding to requests for the gender, racial or
ethnic status of judges for the purpose of establishing the demographic
composition of the state bench seemed to imply that the inquiry itself was
illegitimate. This was true of many state judicial staff members, but
included others as well. For instance, a senior official of a state minority
bar association responded to such an inquiry with indignation, asking why
anyone would think that they had this kind of information. 66 The reply
was simple, the team had assumed (mistakenly, obviously) that such an
organization was likely to promote judicial diversity, among other things,
and in doing so might keep lists of women judges and judges of color in
order to track progress.67
In the context of judicial disciplinary proceedings, the reaction to these
6 1 . See e.g., supra note 54 (discussing the American Bar Association and the
National Center for State Courts as examples of organizations that possess information
on state judges and also have organizational sections on diversity).
62. Id.
63. This was the reason given by an official at the National Council of State
Courts.
64. See Interview supra note 59 (speaking with Shawn Sanford of the Am. Bar
Ass'n).
65. See, e.g.. Interview supra note 59.
66. Incident involving a letter requesting the ethnicity of a short list of judges from
the state of Arizona.
67. E-mail from executives of Arizona Minority Bar Ass'n to Athena D. Mutua,
Professor of Law, SUNY Buffalo Law School (on file with author).
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inquiries elicited a more heightened sense of indignation and illegitimacy.
As more than one person exclaimed: "The real question in the judicial
misconduct conduct context is whether they "did it or not" - whether the
judge in question engaged in misconduct or not." That is, the questions of
gender and particularly racial disparities, with regard to misconduct seemed
to distress all sorts of respondents, who implied that these questions were
inappropriate in a myriad of ways.
All things being equal, these rattled souls might be correct. That is, in a
perfect world, questions of racial, gender, and class discrimination, bias,
disadvantage, disproportionality and disparity might be the wrong
questions to ask in general, and wrong in regard to judicial misconduct, in
particular. However, we do not live in such a country or world.
Gender and racial disparities are ubiquitous in the United States. These
disparities appear in every social indicia of well-being, from health and
mortality status68 to incarceration levels69 to employment, income and
wealth status.70 They also are endemic with regard to access to just about
everything that is socially necessary, from clean water and environmentally
safe neighborhoods7 1 to legal representation.72 Though there is debate
about whether disparities are due to discrimination and bias or something
else, they exist nonetheless. Further, some might argue that these
disparities-for those who lose out- reflect issues that lie within particular

68. See generally ALBELDA & DRAGO, infra note 74. See also CDC Health
Disparities and Inequalities Report 2013, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/other/su6203.pdf (Last visited June 10,
2014).
69. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (New Press 2012); Christopher
Hartney & Linh Vuong, Created Equal: Racial and Ethnic Disparities in the US
Criminal Justice System, NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY (March
2009), http://www.nccdglobal.org/sites/default/ti!es/pubIication_pdf/created-equal. pdf.
70. See generally ALBELDA & DRAGO infra note 74; THOMAS M. SHAPIRO &
MELVIN L. OLIVER, BLACK WEALTH/ WHITE WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL
INEQUALITY (1997); MARIKO LIN CHANG, SHORTCHANGED: WHY WOMEN HAVE LESS
WEALTH AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT (2012).
7 1. See e.g., Tom Romero, The Color of Water: Observations of a Brown Buffalo
in Ten Stanzas, 15 U. DENY. WATER L. REV. 329 (2012) (discussing the racialization
and differential access to water); Robert J. Brulle & David N. Pellow, Environmental
Justice: Human Health and Environmental Inequalities, 27 ANNUAL REV. OF PUB.
HEALTH I03 (2006)(providing an overview on the studies of disparities and inequalities
from an environmental and structural perspective).
72. See e.g., Gerald Ellis, Income Inequality and Unequal Access to Justice, THE
LEGAL FINANCE JOURNAL (2011), http://legalfinancejoumal.com/income-inequality
and-unequal-access-to-justice/.
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individuals or their culture. 73 However, these left out individuals often
belong to groups, women and people of color, who, as Albeda and Drago
note, "are the same groups that lost [out] yesterday, yesteryear, well into
the last century, and often beyond." 74
At the same time, institutional proclamations of support for diversity are
as ubiquitous as gender and racial disparities are throughout American
society. 75 As such, it is curious that research inquiries into disparities in
73. See, e.g., HERITAGE FOUND. , http://www.heritage.org (last visited May 19,
2014); W. Grant Ellis, Freedom is Hard Work (Obamacare Makes it Harder), AM.
THINKER
(Oct.
15,
2009),
http://www.americanthinker.com/2009/I0/freedom_is_hard_work_obamacare.html.;
Defending the Dream: Why Income Inequality Doesn't Threaten Opportunity,
HERITAGE
FOUND.,
( Sept.
14,
2012),
http://www.heritage.org/research/factsheets/2012/09/defending-the-dream-why
income-ineqality-does-not-threaten-opportunity [hereinafter Defending the Dream]
(arguing that social disparities are caused by particular individuals or their culture).
74. RANDY ALBELDA & ROBERT DRAGO, UNLEVEL PLAYING FIELD:
UNDERSTANDING WAGE INEQUALITY AND DISCRIMINATION 35 (4th ed. 2013) (noting
the following disparities in wages: "( ! ) Real wages rose steadily from World War II
until the early 1970s. After that, wages fell through the early 1980s, stagnated through
the mid- l 990s and have risen only slightly since then; (2) Black men still earn only
about eighty percent of the wages of White men; (3) The wage gap between Black and
White women fell over the 1960s and 1970s to less than ten percent.; (4) The male
female wage gap has fallen steadily since the early 1970s; however females earn only a
little more than three quarters what their male counterparts earn; (5) There has been a
slight upward trend in overall unemployment rates in the post-World War II; (6) Black
unemployment rates have consistently been over twice as high as White unemployment
rate, and in contrast, female unemployment rates have usually been lower than male
rates since the early 1980s; (7) Blacks, Hispanics, and women are much more likely
than White men to work in low wage industries and occupations; (8) Race and gender
wage gaps result from differences within as well as between occupations, and (9) Race
and gender wage gaps persist even when age, education, and labor force commitment
are comparable"). Albelda and Drago argue that racial and gender discrimination play a
role in wage disparities between Whites and people of color and women and men.
However, other factors such as education, experience, hours worked, industry and
occupational differences likely play also play large role in the wage gap, even as
discrimination also inheres in structural factors such as labor segmentation and
occupational segregation. Thus, the causes of disparities are likely complicated and
complex.
75. See Kim D. Chanbonpin, "It's a Kakou Thing*: The DADT Appeal and a New
Vocabulary of Anti-Subordination, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 905, 910 (2014)(discussing
diversity programs in the military); Diversity and Inclusion, Ass'N AM. MED. Cs.,
https://www.aamc.org/initiatives/diversity/ (last visited May 19, 2014) (stating "[t]he
AAMC's commitment to diversity includes embracing a broader definition of
"diversity" and supporting our members' diversity and inclusion efforts. . .s"); Diversity
& Inclusion, Ass'N LEGAL ADMIN., http://www.alanet.org/diversity/ (last visited May
19, 2014) (stating ALA's goal is to increase diversity and inclusion in the Association,
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judicial punishment for the purpose of identifying obstacles to achieving
and maintaining diversity on the state judicial bench were met with such
inhospitable reactions. While there may be multiple reasons for this, four
reasons stand out.
First, people may have been resistant to providing information of this
nature because evidence of racial, ethnic, and gender disparities seem to fly
in the face of proclamations claiming support for diversity. Second, it may
be that questions of a person's racial, ethnic, or gender status offends our
conceptions and sensibilities around the meaning of the human person.76
That is, questions such as a judge's racial status seem to compromise
human dignity by, among other things, reducing each unique,
multidimensional individual-with life and professional experiences,
capabilities and talents-to one aspect or dimension of their full
personhood.77 This seems to be an immanently fair concern, but one of
dubious application in the face of processes which may well disadvantage
judges on the basis of that single dimension, ignoring their life and
professional experience, etc.
A third reason might be the context of judicial discipline itself. That is,
questions about racial, ethnic, and/or gender disparities in the context of
judicial discipline may have been seen by some, perhaps correctly, as
questioning whether the proceedings were fair. In fact, a staff member of a
judicial commission made a point of explaining that the commission did
not keep this data because it was irrelevant to the process. She insisted that
no proceeding would ever be conducted because of a person's race,
. .
ethn1c1ty or gender.1s
Finally, a fourth possibility for resistance to the questions posed may be
that the questions undermined a more powerful emergent norm; the
mainstream norm of colorblindness. Colorblindness, presumably, is meant
to capture the notion of human dignity discussed above, counseling that
in the legal management committee and in all legal service organizations"); Corporate
Responsibility:
Diversity,
UPS,
http://www.community.ups.com/UPS+Foundation/Focus+On+Giving/Diversity (last
visited May 19, 2014) (stating "[w]ith more than 400,000 employees and operations in
over 220 countries and territories, we are as diverse as the communities we serve. As a
result, a commitment to diversity and inclusion is deeply entrenched in all facets of our
organization"). See also Grutter v. Bollinger, 1 23 S. Ct. 235, 239 (2003).
76. Rhonda V. Magee, The Third Reconstruction: An Alternative to Race
Consciousness & Colorblindness in Post Slavery America, 54 ALA. L. REV. 483, 485
(2003) (discussing the failures of colorblindness and race consciousness).
77 Id. at 520.
Response of a staff member of the State of Texas judicial commission to inquiries to
confirm whether a set of judges were of Latina/o ethnicity.
78
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However, the mainstream rhetoric of
color is only skin-deep.79
colorblindness facilitates deep reactionary racial work by first separating
color from race and second by disconnecting race from racial hierarchy and
injustice by gaming the society's slippery use of the word "race." The
word "race" is sometimes used to refer simply to biological characteristics,
like color, or to refer to groups historically and currently privileged or
disadvantaged by the U.S. system of racial hierarchy, or to the system of
hierarchy itself. This system is a socially constructed hierarchal structure
of privilege and domination based on phenotype (color), among other traits.
This hierarchy, alive and well today, socially positions Whites over people
of color and structures the mal-distribution of resources and opportunities
through past and current actions, arrangements, and processes of people,
institutions and social systems.
Thus mainstream colorblindness works by ignoring the connections
between color, groups and hierarchy and facilitates easy disjuncture. First,
it separates color from race, despite the fact that the system of racial
oppression by Whites over people of color is based on color. Second it
facilitates the easy substitution of "race" for "color" thereby suggesting that
"race" is only skin-deep, 80 and that people should not be reduced simply to
their "race."8 1 In doing so, this emerging norm conveniently disconnects
race - as only skin-deep- from the structure of racial hierarchy based on
phenotype (color).
Third, used strategically by politicians, judges, the media and others, the
idea that society should be race blind counsels against racial remedies and
justice (such as affirmative action programs), which when heeded, maintain
in the modern moment what Justice Harlan assumed would be the case in
the future - the maintenance of White dominance and privilege. A
progressive notion at the time, Justice Harlan, in his famous dissent in
Plessey v. Ferguson, 82 rhetorically and aspirationally proclaimed the
colorblindness of the law, on the one hand, while assuming the superiority
of the White race socially, on the other.83 The modern Supreme Court can
79. IAN HANEY-LOPEZ, DOG WHISTLE POLITICS: How CODED RACIAL APPEALS
HAVE REINVENTED RACISM AND WRECKED THE MIDDLE CLASS 86 (2014) (discussing
the "allure of colorblindness" and discussing its development from an aspirational idea
to a reactionary ideological tool that enhances and furthers the "new racism" that has
enlivened prejudice and had a detrimental effect on the economy).
80. Id.
81. See generally e.g., MICHAEL OM! et al., RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED
STATES: FROM THE 1960s TO THE 1990s (2nd ed. 1994).
82. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
83. Id.. at 559 (stating, "The White race deems itself to be the dominant race in
this country. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth, and in
power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great
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be said to have resurrected this idea; and in doing so, has chosen to ignore
race as structure and its present day operation and effects. 84 In addition, the
Court has ignored the more expansive notion wistfully imagined by Martin
Luther King, Jr. However, King, in aspiring to a time when people would
be judged by their character rather than the color of their skin, envisioned a
colorblind idea that required both equality and justice for people
historically oppressed both by law and socially, including the social,
cultural and economic realms, all of which are shaped by law. 85 King's
concept recognized and sought remedy for the differing social positioning
of Whites and people of color. He also presumably, given the times,
invoked a concept capable of embracing the acknowledgement, celebration,
pride, and solidarity around difference. 86 That said, even the law has never
been colorblind even when race, as a construct or a biological reference to
peoples' skin-color, has gone unmentioned (i.e. race-neutral laws). 87
heritage, and holds fast to the principles of constitutional liberty. But in view of the
constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling
class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our constitution is color-blind, and neither
knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are
equal before the law"). See also Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle
School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 772-73 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing
in favor of prohibiting public schools in the school district from considering race in
their assignment of pupils to schools in the effort to maintain integrated schooling.
Thomas noting: "I am quite comfortable in the company I keep. My view of the
Constitution is Justice Harlan's view in Plessy: 'Our Constitution is color-blind, and
neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizenss"'). Though Justice Thomas goes on
to claim this notion as it grew out of the civil rights era tradition, the two notions are
quite different and grow out of different circumstances.
84. The Court has held that societal discrimination and oppression wrought by
three hundred or so years of "racialized slavery, Jim Crow laws, gerrymandered voting
districts, racially restrictive immigration laws, internment camps, stolen land grants,
silenced languages and lost identity" is too amorous to remedy. See Wygant v. Jackson
Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267,s276 (1986) (quoting Justice Powell) and Stephanie
Phillips, The Convergence of the Critical Race Theory Workshop with LatCrit Theory:
A History, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1247 (1999) (discussing various experiences of
racism).
85. See Ned Resnikoff, Four Ways Martin Luther King Jr. Wanted to Battle
Inequality, MSNBC (Jan. 19, 2014), http://www.msnbc.com/all/mlks-fight-against
economic-inequality0
86. This is an idea that I have discussed in other forms. See Athena Mutua, The
Rise, Development, & Future Directions of Critical Race Theory & Related
Scholarship, 84 DENY. U. L. REV. 329, 335-36 (2006).; Valuing Difference, Exercising
Care in Oz: The Shaggy Man's Welcome, 20 S. Cal. INTERDISC. L. J. 215, 230-237
(2010).
87. The Supreme Court is certain that the society and the law should be
colorblind. See e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 341-42 (2003)(explaining that
race-conscious admissions must have a logical end and expressing expectation that in
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Mainstream colorblindness, and gender blindness by analogy, thus
rhetorically translates the aspiration that the color of one's skin should not
matter into the ahistorical and present-day falsehood that the color ofonet's
skin does not matter.
In other words, many scholars have critiqued the mainstream colorblind
notion, not just for masking the connection between color and race and race
as a hierarchal structure but also for the way the Court applies it.88 They
argue that the Court assumes that a colorblind society already exists in law
and elsewhere, and then renders decisions based on this fiction, this
charade.89 It thus further compounds the disconnect between racial
25 years they will not be necessary). But it is not clear that the Court is correct and that
there are no other worthy visions of the future, despite the Court's certainty. Seeing
"color" is not the same thing as denying people opportunities because of their color or
assuming characteristics about them - racism. Nevertheless, even where the law never
mentions race or the ethnicity of a person or group, the law often is not colorblind in
any way that matters. See generally e.g. Michele Alexander, supra note 69. Further
consider the colorblind laws of the New Deal. Again, the New Deal laws did not
mention race but they were intentionally racially constructed See generally e.g.,
MICHAEL K. BROWN, ET AL., WHITEWASHING RACE: THE MYTH OF COLOR-BLIND
SOCIETY (2003). But today's jurisprudence is even more sinister as it may simply
camouflage bias at the level of the Supreme Court.
88. See e.g., HANEY-LOPEZ, supra note 79; Francisco Valdes & Sumi Cho, Critical
Race Materialism: Theorizing Justice in the Wake of Global Neoliberalism, 43 CONN.
L. REV. 1513 (2011); Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1589 (2009);
Girardeau A. Spann, The Conscience of a Court, U. MIAMI L. REV. 431 (2009)
(suggesting that the conservative majority on the Court is engaged in racial
discrimination in Parents v. Seattle and that the Court "merely relies on a standard
litany of assertions, derived from prior affirmative action cases, that were never
themselves supported by adequate instrumental justifications"); Ian F. Haney Lopez, "A
Nation of Minoritiess": Race, Ethnicity and Reactionary Colorblindness, 59 STAN. L.
REV. 985 (2007) (tracing the history of colorblindness); Girardeau A. Spann,
Affirmative Action and Discrimination, 39 HOWARD L.J. I, 63-90 (1s995) (discussing
the fallacy of equating benign and invidious discrimination, a function of
colorblindness reasoning); Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Affirmative Action and
Colorblindness from the Original Position, 78 TUL. L. REV. 2009 (2004) (arguing
against colorblind constitutionalism in Grutter); Jerome Mccristal Culp, Jr., Colorblind
Remedies and the Intersectionality of Oppression: Policy Arguments Masquerading as
Moral Claims, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 162 (1994) (arguing that colorblindness allows the
legal infrastructure to maintain its bias against racial minorities); Neil Gotanda, A
Critique of "Our Constitution Is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991)
(demonstrating how the Supreme Court through its use of colorblindness perpetuates
discrimination).
89. See e.g., Gotanda supra note 88. "Charade" is defined as "an absurd pretense
intended to create a pleasant or respectable appearance . . . . " DEFINITION OF CHARADE,
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/americanenglish/charade (Last visited
July 15, 2014) [Hereinafter CHARADE, OXFORD]; "Something that is done in order to
pretend something is true when it is not really true. . . an empty or deceptive act or
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hierarchy and skin color that the mainstream notion of colorblindness
rhetorically accomplishes. The effect has been to freeze the status quo of
skin-based privilege, domination, disadvantage and oppression in place and
0
project it into the future.9 In fact, some scholars suggest that it is the
Court's intention, as well as, many of its adherents, to freeze in place the
current material conditions of White domination from which White
privilege arises, along with its attendant consequences of White access to
91
The Court, as such, it is argued,
superior resources and opportunity.
perpetuates disadvantage, while simultaneously - as others have in the past
- claiming to promote equality, freedom and justice.92
Some go even further, arguing that both colorblindness in law and post
racialism in political discourse are not simply meant to mask and then
conveniently ignore current discrimination, oppression and mal-distribution
of resources.93 Rather, they mean to accomplish these goals while also
delegitimizing racial justice movements' social, legal, political and
economic critiques along with their remedial demands, as well as, their
self-regarding efforts and celebrations, as a means for further facilitating
94
As
White privilege and White conscious solidarity in discrimination.
pretense."
DEFINITION
OF
CHARADE,
http://www.merriam
webster.com/dictionary/charade (Last visited on June 6, 2014) [Hereinafter CHARADE,
MERRIAM].
90. See e.g., Jerome Mccristal Culp, Jr., supra note 88.
91. This suggests something more than just indifference to the plight of people of
color. See Spann, The Conscience of a Court supra note 88. See also Zeus Leonardo,
supra note 37 (explaining that human action, agency and not simply structure is
responsible for the continuation of domination and oppression).
92. See e.g. , Derrick Bell, The Constitutional Contradiction, in WE ARE NOT
SAVED: THE ILLUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (discussing the Founding Fathers
claims of fighting for freedom, liberty and justice while maintaining slavery); and
Valdes & Cho, supra note 88, at 1517 (discussing the ways in which the current Court
and society seek and are maintaining material and structural oppression of people of
color while asserting an ideology of equality through colorblindness which in part aids
in maintaining disadvantage).
93. See generally Cho, Post-Racialism supra note 88.
94. Id. Compare Reva Siegal, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An
Emerging Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278 (2011)
(suggesting that one can discern a concern about racial balkanization in the Court's
jurisprudence). With regard to attempts by Whites to limit the self-regarding efforts
and celebrations of people of color, consider the recent case involving Arizona's law
banning the teaching of ethnic studies as inappropriately race related in public schools;
particularly the teaching of Mexican-American history to Mexican -American students,
whose test scores and interests in school increased substantially after taking these
classes. Arizona claims that the courses are not only impermissibly race-related but
stimulate racial resentment, presumably toward Whites. See Cindy Carcamo, Judge
upholds Arizona law banning ethnic studies classes, LA TIMES (March 1 2, 2013),
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such, to the extent people accept and internalize this emergent norm, these
critics understand them as having an interest in (benefitting from) and/or
uncritically accepting colorblind pretenses and post-racial nonsense.
In response to requests for information about judges' racial and ethnic
status, some respondents may have been reacting out of this internalized
norm; one where acknowledgment of difference seemed inappropriate, as
dictated by the narrow supremacy enhancing precepts of colorblindness.
However, these reactions, no matter the motivation, coupled with the actual
lack of data in the context of identifying disparities and problems,
nonetheless work to tell the lie of present-day equality and freedom while
frustrating its future possibility.
Nevertheless, preliminary results of the study provide even these people
something about which to smile. Some of the disparities appear quite small
though statistically significant. In addition, the ABA is working on a
project that seeks to provide the numbers of women and judges of color as
part of determining the overall composition of the state judicial bench.95
However, this project will represent the then-current bench; thus,
longitudinal studies that draw on information that predate the new database
likely will be forced to continue to employ more ad hoc methods of
tracking the composition trends of the state bench.96
These reactions did flag one other concern. In the book Presumed
Incompetent, many of the book's stories are about innocent survivors of
discriminatory outrage. 97 But, in the misconduct context, many of the
people involved are more visibly flawed; they made mistakes or potentially
engaged in outright misconduct, ethically or otherwise. 98 That is, they
appear less sympathetic. Yet, basic fairness remains the issue. As in the
criminal justice system, the question is the same: Why should a
disproportionate number of people of color have their lives ruined (here
through discipline or removal) for engaging in conduct in which an equal
number or more White individuals engage, receiving instead a mere slap on
the wrist (drug use is the classic example)?99
Despite these challenges, the study managed to collect and compile the

http://articles.latimes.com/20 I3/mar/ I2/nation/la-na-nn-ff-ethnic-studies-arizona201303 l 2.
95. Interview with Peter Koelling, supra note 59.
96. Id.
97. See generally, Presumed Incompetent, supra note 36.
98. See Seeking Justice, supra note 2, at l 0-11.
99. See e.g., Michelle Alexander, supra note 69; Human Rights Watch, United
States - Punishment & Prejudice: Racial Disparities in the War on Drugs (May 2000),
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/usa/ (Last visited March 7, 2014).
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data needed. 1 00 This paper will turn to this data after first situating the
judicial discipline process within the varied mechanisms employed to
promote the administration of justice and then describing the construction,
omissions and limitations of the database.
II. OVERVIEW OF JUDICIARY SELECTION AND DISCIPLINE PROCEDURES:
INDEPENDENCE, ACCOUNTABILITY, QUALITY AND DIVERSITY
Judicial discipline procedures are simply one set of mechanisms that
states use to both organize and regulate the judiciary. Other mechanisms
include rules, codes of behavior, legal standards and procedures, as well as
systems and institutions for the selection, promotion, retention, and
evaluation of judges and their performance.
The systems and institutions that govern selecting, promoting, retaining
and disciplining judges, theoretically, serve to promote, on the one hand,
the goal and value of judicial independence and on the other hand,
accountability. The concept of judicial independence is one of the bedrocks
of American judicial thought. 101 Ensuring it, in part, is meant to shield the
judiciary both from the vagrancies of politics, including oversight from
those outside the judicial branch (e.g. partisanship) and from corruption by
private and public parties (e.g. bribery). 102 It is meant to secure impartiality
of judges. However, independent judges or an independent judiciary
means that judges potentially wield tremendous power. This power must
be checked against abuse. It must also be rendered legitimate, a necessity,
in a democratic order. Consequently, these systems and institutions are
also meant to promote both democratic accountability and accountability
against wrong-doing. 103 Scholars see the values of independence and
accountability as opposing ideas or at least ideas in tension with one
another. 104 Geoffrey Miller sums up the tensions commenting that the
policy tradeoffs between the two are unavoidable. He notes:
Independence safeguards the public against governmental
oppression or expropriation and protects against corruption of the
administration of justice by private interests. At the same time,
judges wield enormous authority including the power of judicial
review. Accordingly, their independence cannot be unlimited. They
must be accountable to the public through some type of democratic
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

See infra Part III.
Geoffrey P. Miller, Bad Judges, 83 TEX. L. REV. 431, 456-7 (2004).
Id.
However, accountability to the public can stifle and skew independence. Id.
Id.
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process. The tradeoff between independence and accountability is
unavoidable. . . 1 05
The mechanisms of selection and discipline, among others, are often
meant to promote two other values important to the judiciary's
administration of justice. These are the values and goals of quality,
primarily in terms of a judge's, integrity and impartiality (again), and the
value of diversity. 1 06 Independence and accountability when both working
together can enhance the quality of judges. As Miller notes, "if judges are
not independent, they will be subject to influences that could distort the
outcomes of cases, skew the development of substantive law, and detract
from public confidence in the judicial system." 107 Said differently, the
quality of the decisions and substantive law are both enhanced because
outside influence, seeking to satisfy its own interests only and potentially
distorting an entire line of cases, is minimized. Accountability further
contributes to the quality of the judiciary by penalizing poor service and
unethical behavior that might otherwise flourish. 108
A relatively new development, the value of diversity has increasingly
become a stated goal of the legal bar. 109 A presidential initiated report of
the American Bar Association explains that "lawyers and judges have a
unique responsibility for sustaining a political system with broad
participation by all its citizens," and notes that a diverse bar instills trust
and legitimacy for government and the rule of law. This sentiment is made
more important in a country projected to be a majority minority country in
less than forty years. 1 1 0 That is, questions of representation and inclusion
matter in a democracy. 1 1 1 Further, in the context of the courts specifically,

I 05. Id. at 456.
I 06. Miller, supra note IO I, at 456; Rachel Paine Caufield, Inside Merit Selection:
A National Survey of Judicial Nominating Commissions, DRAKE UNIV. DEP'T OF
POLITICS AND INT'L RELATIONS 5, 5 (2012).
107. Miller, supra not IO I, at 456.
108. Miller, supra note I O I, at 77.
I09. See e.g., Cie Armstead, American Bar Ass'n Presidential Diversity Initiative,
Diversity in the Legal Profession: The Next Steps 6 (April 20 I0), available at
http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/documents/aba_diversity_report_2
010.pdf. See also e.g., Legal Profession Increasingly Recognizes Diversity as Critical
Issue, University of Virginia
School of Law (Mar. 29,
2004),
https://www. law. virginia.edu/html/news/2004_spr/diversity_legal.htm
110. Diversity as a Critical Issue, supra note I09, at 6.
111. See generally CTR. FOR JUSTICE, LAW AND Soc'y AT GEORGE MASON UNIV.,
IMPROVING DIVERSITY ON THE STATE COURTS: A REPORT FROM THE BENCH 6 (2009)
(noting also that a diverse bench may provide models for young lawyers who may be
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judges have a duty to be open and responsive to all, to "dispense justice
fairly and [to] administer the laws equally," a process that is subject to
1 12
public doubt where the institution itself is exclusionary and segregated.
Thus, the judiciary should reflect the diversity of the people it serves.
In addition, an important argument for judicial diversity is its
relationship to quality. However, this is quality in a second sense; namely,
the quality of judicial decision-making as a process and thus the quality of
the decisions. Here, diversity is said to improve the process of decision
making because it brings different perspectives, experiences, and
interpretations of law to bear on decision-making, on the decisions
themselves, and on awareness of the potential impact decisions may have
13
on different communities.'
Recent studies have shown that diverse
groups perform better (and quicker) at solving problems, particularly
1 14
complex problems, and are superior at predicting outcomes.
Professor
Page suggests that performance is enhanced because in diverse groups,
different people bring different perspectives, frames of reference
115
( organizing categories), tools, and problem solving skills to the table.
How to balance the competing goals of judicial independence and
accountability in a democratic order has been the focus of debate for many
encouraged to become judges). See also Sylvia R. Lazos, Only Skin Deep: The Cost of
Partisan Politics on Minority Diversity of the Federal Bench, 83 IND. L.J. 1423, 1424
(2008); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Representative Government, Representative Court?
The Supreme Court as a Representative Body, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1252, 1258-59 (2006).
1s12. CTR. FOR JUSTICE, supra note 1 11, at 6.
113. Id. See also Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 1 1 1, at 1263, 1265; Michele
Benedetto Neitz, Socioeconomic Bias in the Judiciary, 61 CLEV. .ST. L. REV. 137 (20 1s3)
(arguing that judicial benches without members who know or at least can imagine
economic disadvantage are probably more likely to make decisions that burden poor
people). But see, Lazos, supra note 111 , at 1432 (questioning whether judges of color
are rendering distinctively different decisions, given the political nature of
appointments, and explaining that adding diverse judges to the bench plays multiple
roles and potentially improves decision-making).
1s14. See Robert Burgoyne, et al., Navigating a Complex Landscape to Foster
Greater Faculty and Student Diversity in Higher Education, AM. Ass'N FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF SCI. 12 (20s1s0) (finding that students learn more and the workforce
is more productive and successful in a broadly diverse setting). See also Patricia Gurin,
et al., Diversity and Higher Education: Theory and Impact on Educational Outcomes,
72 HARV. EDUC. REV. 330, 330-36 (2002); Helen Lippman, Variety Is the Spice of a
Great Workforce, Bus. & HEALTH ARCHIVE (May I, 2000); Somnath Saha et al.,
Student Body Racial and Ethnic Composition and Diversity-Related Outcomes in US
Medical Schools, 10 JAMA 1135, 1s1 41 (2008); SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE: How
THE POWER OF DIVERSITY CREATES BETTER GROUPS, FIRMS, SCHOOLS AND SOCIETIES
314 (Princeton Univ. Press ed. 2008).
1 1 5. PAGE, supra note 1 1 4, at 328 (Princeton Univ. Press ed. 2008) (discussing
cross cultural/national diversity primarily).
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years. 1 16 Ensuring these, as well as, the diversity and quality of judges on
the bench are additional goals that the various systems for the selection and
disciplining of judges, in varying degrees, seek to address.
A. Selection and Promotion ofState Judges
Judicial selection processes vary considerably by state and invariably
build on three basic models involving elections, appointments, or merit
based systems. 1 1 7 In addition, states may combine certain features of
different models or use different models at different levels of the judiciary
(final, intermediate, and trial). 1 18 As such, most state selection processes
are unique. Generally, elections may be partisan or nonpartisan. In
nonpartisan judicial elections, the candidates appear on the ballot without
any party affiliation. 1 19 In contrast, partisan elections include a candidate's
party affiliation provided on the ballot. In the appointment model, the state
executive (or governor) appoints judges to the bench. Similar in some
ways to the federal system, 1 20 some states require that the state senate
116. See Paul Carrington, Judicial Independence and Democratic Accountability in
Highest State Courts, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 80 (1998). See also John
Ferejohn, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Explaining Judicial
Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 353, 381 (1999); Pamela S. Karlan, Two Concepts of
Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 535, 558 (1999); Judith S. Kaye,
Safeguarding a Crown Jewel: Judicial Independence and Lawyer Criticism of Courts,
25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 703, 711 (1997); Alex Kozinski, The Many Faces of Judicial
Independence, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 861, 872-73 (1998); Sandra Day O'Connor,
Judicial Accountability Must Safeguard, not Threaten, Judicial Independence: An
Introduction, 48 DENY. U. L. REV. I, 2 (2008); David Pimentel, Reframing the
Independence v. Accountability Debate: Defining Judicial Structure in Light of Judges'
Courage and Integrity, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. I, 6 (2009); Herbert Weschler, Toward
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. I , 12 (1959).
117. LAWYERS COMM., supra note 52, at 3.
1 18. Id. at 8; See also American Judicature Society, Merit Selection: The Best Way
to
Choose
the
Best
Judge,
AM.
JUDICATURE
Soc'v,
http://www.judicialselection.com/uploads/documents/ms_descrip_ l I 85462202120.pdf
(last visited March 2, 2014) [hereinafter Merit Selection].
119. See Merit Selection, supra note 118.
120. In the federal system, except for federal magistrates and non-Article III judges
(such as tax court judges), federal judges are appointed by the President of the United
States and confirmed by the U.S. Senate, pursuant to the Appointments Clause in
Article II of the U.S. Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. II,s§ 2. Vetting of presidential
nominees for federal courts happens at multiple levels. The Presidential staff first
interviews and vets judicial nominees and then the Senate Judiciary Committee vets a
nominee generally through a public hearing (especially for Supreme Court nominees)
before it votes to confirm a judicial appointment. See How the Federal Courts are
Organized, Federal Judges and How They Get Appointed, FED. Juo. CTR.,
http://www.fjc.gov/federal/courts.nsf/autoframe?OpenForm&nav=menu3c&page=/fede
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confirm the governor's appointment. 121 Merit-based systems often involve
both a governor appointing judges and elections. 1 22 Under the merit model,
however, the governor is restricted to appointing judges from a list of
candidates recommended by a judicial nominating commission. 1 23 This
commission is responsible for soliciting applications, evaluating and
interviewing the judicial applicants, and selecting and placing a limited
number of "nominated" candidates on the list from which the governor
4
Thus, the judicial
must appoint for a particular judicial position. 12
nominating commission is the key to the judicial merit model. 125 Once
appointed, the judge in this model must stand for a retention election; one
in which voters are asked to vote yes or no on the question of whether the
judge should be retained.
In 1940, Missouri adopted the first merit-based judicial selection plan in
the United States. The Missouri Plan, however, only covers the large
metropolitan areas in Missouri, whereas the state uses elections for
selecting judges in areas not covered by the Plan. 1 26 Although no two state
plans are identical, currently thirty-six states and the District of Columbia
use a merit-based system for selection for some or all of its judges. 1 27
The American Judiciary Society (AJS), among others, recommends that
states use merit-based systems to select and promote judges. 128 It suggests
that merit systems not only foster the independence of judges but also are
better at promoting-in a third sense-the quality of judges and the
judiciary. Because the nominating committees assess judicial candidates, it
seeks to assess not only the integrity and potential impartiality of judges
but also other characteristics, such as knowledge of the law and
temperament. 1 29 These other types of characteristics, theoretically, also
ral/courts.nsf/page/ A783011AF949B6BF85256B35004AD2 l 4?opendocument
(last
visited May 19, 2014) (explaining the disciplinary process of the federal judiciary).
121. See Jona Goldschmidt, Merit Selection: Current Status, Procedures & Issues,
49 U. MIAMI L. REV. I , 9-10 (1994).
122. See id. at I0.
123. Id.
124. Id.s; Merit Selection, supra note 118. See generally, Caufield, Inside Merit
Selection, supra note I 06.
125. Caufield, Inside Merit Selection, supra note 106, at 5 (citing ALLAN ASHMAN
AND JAMES J. ALFINI, THE KEY TO JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION: THE NOMINATING
PROCESS 12 (1974)).
126. See Judicial Selection in the States: Missouri, supra note 9.
127. See Caufield, supra note 106, at 2, 5.
128. See K.O. Myers, Merit Selection and Diversity on the Bench, 46 IND. L. REV.
43, 43 (2013).
129. See id. at 46, 48 n.40.
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contribute to the quality of decisions, to which a diversity of perspectives is
also meant to contribute. Judicial elections, some argue, do not necessarily
ensure knowledge and temperament capabilities, as the voting population
may be unaware or uninformed about a candidate' s legal ability and
credentials. 1 30
Regarding diversity, recent studies exploring the relationship between
diversity and judicial selection processes generally conclude that none of
the selection processes is superior to the others in rendering a more diverse
bench. 1 3 1 However, Myers suggests that the use of judicial nominating
commissions has one advantage, in terms of diversity, over election and
appointment processes. This advantage is that states through statutes or the
commissions themselves can identify diversity as an institutional
·
•
pnonty. 1 32
Again, this centers judicial nominating commissions and renders their
composition and priorities important aspects of the analysis. 1 33 A recent
study on nominating commissions presented evidence suggesting that
commissions that are themselves diverse, attract a more diverse applicant
pool, 1 34 a factor that has an impact on who and what kinds of people in the
final analysis become judges. It also noted that the number of women and
people of color serving on nominating commissions has steadily increased
over the years, 1 35 although the number of participating people of color is
small and the pace of increase glacial. 1 36 The report suggests that women
are increasingly nominated in numbers in proportion to their numbers in the
130. Caufield, supra note 106, at 4.
13 I . See Myers, supra note 128, at 5 1, 54-55 (discussing a number of these reports
and focusing on the process in Indiana); Mark S. Hurwitz & Drew Noble Lanier,
Diversity in State and Federal Appellate Courts, 29 JUST. SYS. J. 47, 67 (2008); Mark S.
Hurwitz & Drew Noble Lanier, Explaining Judicial Diversity: The Differential Ability
of Women and Minorities to Attain Seats on State Supreme and Appellate Courts, 3 ST.
POL. & PoL'Y Q. 329, 345-46 (2003) [hereinafter Explaining Judicial Diversity]; Mark
S. Hurwitz & Drew Noble Lanier, Women and Minorities on State and Federal
Appellate Benches, 1 985 and 1999, 85 JUDICATURE 84, 92 (200 1-2002); Ciara Torres
Spelliscy, Monique Chase & Emma Greenman, Improving Judicial Diversity,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE 4 (20 I0), ; Nicholas 0. Alozie, Selection Methods and the
Recruitment of Women to State Courts of last Resort, 77 Soc. SCI. Q.s110, 122-24
( 1996); Nicholas 0. Alozie, Black Representation on State Judiciaries, 4 Soc. SCI. Q.
69, 984-85 (1988); Nicholas 0. Alozie, Distribution of Women and Minority Judges:
The Effects ofJudicial Selections Methods, 7 1 Soc. SCI. Q. 3 15, 3 2 1 (1990).
132. Myers, supra note 128, at 51.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 52 (discussing Caufield, supra note I06).
135. Id.
136. Id.
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population, but nominations of people of color seem dependent on their
representation in the applicant pool (who actually applies), even though
nominating commissions may be charged with soliciting applications from
qualified applicants. 137 However, the study found that diversity in general
was a low priority for most nominating commissions. 138
B. Judicial Disciplinary Procedures 139
All fifty states have a judicial disciplinary body, referred to here as
commissions. 140 States call commissions by a variety of names. 141 These
commissions receive complaints from the public, investigate the
complaints, hold hearings, and either impose sanctions or recommend the
imposition of sanctions to a state supreme court, which often makes the
final determination. 142 Generally, the primary purpose of disciplinary
procedures is to protect the public, deter future judicial misconduct, and at
the same time, protect the independence of the judiciary. 143 As such, the
purpose of disciplinary procedures is not to punish per se. Rather, their
overall purpose is to ensure the integrity of the judiciary and preserve
public confidence in it. 144
As one of the purposes of judicial administration is to protect judicial
independence, disciplinary commissions' jurisdiction is restricted. The
grounds for discipline are generally limited to willful misconduct or
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. As Cynthia Gray
elaborates, these and other grounds include:
[T]he willful misconduct in office, conduct prej udicial to the
137. Id.
1 38. Id.
1 39. Federal judges can also be disciplined. Disciplinary measures include informal
measures as well as formal measures, such as censure or reprimand. However,
generally these judges can only be removed if impeached by the House and convicted
of an offense by the Senate. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § § 2, 3; art. II, § 4; art III, § 1. See
also JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DISCIPLINE IN THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL COURTS:
MISCONDUCT,
PREVENTING
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/Jud_Conduct_Discipline_English_20 I0.pdf/$
file/Jud_Conduct_Discipline_English_20 I0.pdf (last visited May 2 1, 20 I4)
[Hereinafter JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DISCIPLINE] (summarizing the disciplinary steps
of the Judicial Conduct and Disabilities Act of 1980).
140. Cynthia Gray, Judicial Conduct Commissions: How Judicial Conduct
Commissions Work, 28 JUST. SYS. J. 405, 405 (2007).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 405, 4 14.
143. Id. at 405.
144. Id.
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administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute,
persistent failure to perform judicial duties, habitual intemperance, and
conviction of a crime. In some states, a significant violation of the code
of judicial conduct, adopted by each state's high court, is automatically
considered misconduct in office or conduct prejudicial to the
. .
.
.
. 1 45
admm1strat10n ofJustice.

Due to jurisdictional limits, comm1ss1ons dismiss over 90% of the
complaints brought against judges 146 (and complaints remain confidential
in most states). 147 The majority of these dismissals involve complaints that
the judge made an error of fact, of law, or abused discretion. 148 Except in
the case where a litigant can demonstrate a pattern of errors, these claims
must be handled by legal appeal to a higher court.
A state's constitution, statute, or court rules may establish a disciplinary
commission. 149 Most commissions across the states are comprised of seven
to eleven members, but may have as many as twenty-eight or as few as five
commissioners. 1 50 State commissions are often composed of a combination
of judges, lawyers, and laypeople. In some states, the state supreme court
appoints the judges to the commission, the state bar selects the lawyers, and
the governor appoints the lay members. However, appointment of
commissioners varies. For instance, the governor or the legislature may
appoint all commissioners. In a few states, the commission itself or the
review process is bifurcated, such that the commission has two panels, one
which investigates a complaint and one which adjudicates the case; or there
are two separate commissions, again, one for investigating and prosecuting
a case and the other for hearing the case once the investigatory commission
recommends that it go forward.
All fifty states require that commission proceedings remain confidential,
at least during the investigatory stage. 1 5 1 Confidentiality seeks both to
protect an individual complainant from possible retaliation by the judge
and to encourage the public to file complaints against misbehaving
judges. 1 52 At the same time, confidentiality protects judges against
frivolous or unwarranted complaints, which might unfairly tarnish their
reputations. Neither the commissioners nor their staff can reveal that a
1 45.
1 46.
1 47.
1 48.
1 49.
1 50.
151.
1 52.

Id. at 406.
See id. at 408.
Id. at 408-9.
See id. at 408.
Id. at 406.
Id.
Id. at 409.

/d. at 4 1 0.
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particular person has lodged a complaint against a judge nor reveal that a
judge is the subject of an investigation. However, in most states the
complainant can choose to reveal that she has filed a complaint. 153
If a commission finds that a judge has engaged in misconduct, states
have a variety of private and public sanctions that they may impose.
Although sanctions vary among states, most have some form of private and
public reprimand. 1 54 However, at any stage of the disciplinary process, an
informal process can be initiated in which a judge may admit to misconduct
in exchange for an agreed upon sanction. These sanctions also range from
private and public reprimands to an agreement to resign in lieu of
continuing the formal proceeding.
Disciplinary procedures and judicial selection processes, as well as other
mechanisms such as long tenure for judges and performance evaluations,
are just some of the mechanisms states use to promote the independence,
accountability, quality, and diversity of judges and state judicial systems.
III. THE STATE BENCH NATIONALLY AND THE DATABASE
A. BriefLook at the State Bench
As of 2012, there were total of 17,367 state judges. 1 55 From the table
below, it is clear that the number of state judges has steadily increased over
the past decade or so with an addition of almost 1000 judges since 2005,
despite the slight dip in numbers in 2012. 156
Table 1 1 57
Number of Judges on the State Bench by Year
Year

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

N umber
of State
Judges

1 6,426

1 6,64 1

1 6,805

1 6,950

1 7,11 5 1 7,375 1 7,459 1 7,367

20 1 1

20 1 2

I 53. Id.
1 54. Id. at 4 1 5.
1 55. 1 THE AMERICAN BENCH, supra note 57. The American Bench stops tallying
the numbers of judges in May of the preceding year. Thus, the 20 I3 volume tallies the
number of judges as of May 20s1 2.
1 56. It may be that the dip in the 20 1 2 numbers reflects the 2008 financial crisis, the
subsequent contraction of opportunities in the legal field, and state financial trouble.
However, this is speculation and it will be interesting to see if the decline continues.
1 57. I THE AMERICAN BENCH, supra note 57.
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Of this number, 12,459 were men and 4,908 were women. 158 Generally
more is known about the gender composition of the state bench than the
racial composition of it because Forster, Inc., producers of the directory
entitled "The American Bench," began producing a gender report as of
2006 ( for the year 2005). Women as a percentage of the state courts have
steadily increased as the chart below demonstrates.
Table 2t159
Gender Breakdown of Judges on the State Bench by Year
Date

Intermediate General

Final
Court

M

F

M

F

M

2005

255

98

680

249

2006

257

1 02

681

2007

256

1 06

2008

255

2009

Limited
Jurisdiction

Total

Totals

M

F

M

F

8 0 1 4 2 1 33

3598

1 399

1 2,547

3879

1 6,426

250

8093

2237

360 1

1 420

1 2 ,632

4009

1 6,641

668

264

8074 2332

3628

1 477

1 2,626

4 1 79

1 6,805

1 04

647

279

8 1 23

2440

3600

1 502

1 2,625

4325

1 6,950

248

118

64 1

294

8097 2557

3601

1 559

1 2,589

4528

1 7, 1 e1 5

20 1 0

254

113

65e1

3 09

8 1 90 2657

3587

1614

12,682

4693

1 7,375

20 1 1

245

1 16

661

3 16

828 1

2768

3476

1 596

1 2,663

4796

1 7,459

20 1 2

235

1 20

642

315

8 1 85

2893

3 397

1 580

1 2,459

4908

1 7367

F

While the number of women on the state bench has increased, it appears
that the number of judges of color has decreased. A report based on ABA
data in the year 2000 reports that judges of color constituted 10.1 % of the
state bench, 1 60 but the ABA in 2010 reports that judges of color constitute
1 5 8. I THE AMERICAN BENCH, supra note 57. These numbers are found in the
gender report which also includes federal j udges. The federal judges are subtracted to
get these figures.
1 59. Table 2 : Gender Breakdown of Judges on the State Bench by Year. This table
represents a compilation of information from the gender report in the AMERICAN
BENCH from years 2006 to 20 1 3 . See I THE AMERICAN BENCH, supra note 57.
1 60. LAWYERS COMM., supra note 52, at 8; A BA Database on Judicial Diversity,
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only 8.3% of the bench. In comparing Reddick, Nelson and Caufield's
report on judicial diversity in 2008 to the ABA 20 1 0 report, this potential
decrease is supported. 161 The comparison reveals that the percentage of
judges of color in 2010 had decreased in twenty-three states including New
York, with two states dropping down to 0%, even as an additional five
states remained at 0% of judges of color. 162 Both California and New
Mexico, however, increased their percentage of judges of color
. .
s1gmfi1cant l y. 163
This article uses 20 1 0 as its base year. For instance, this article uses the
figure of 27% to refer to the percentage of women judges that comprise the
state bench. This is the percentage of women judges on state courts for the
year 20 1 0. There were 1 7,375 judges in 20 1 0 of which 1 2,682 were men
and 4,693 were women. The 2010 year figures are used for this article
because it is the last year the ABA provided any data on judges of color. 164
During that year, there were 1 ,436 judges of color; and as such, judges of
color constituted 8.3% of the state bench. Consequently, there exists a
complete data set regarding women and people of color from which to
make comparisons.
In short, the data confirms that the judiciary at the state level remains
overwhelmingly White and male. 165 Based on 20 1 0 census data, non
Latina/o Whites make up 63% of the population, but comprise
approximately 9 1 . 7% of those sitting on state judicial benches. 166 Men
generally make up approximately 49. 1 % of the population, but comprise
73% of state judges. 167 Obviously, these numbers, particularly the racial
numbers, vary across states. For example, while California is a "majority
supra note 58; I THE AMERICAN BENCH, supra note 57.
1 6 1 . Compare REDDICK et al., supra note 56, at 4, with ABA Database on Judicial
Diversity, supra note 58.
1 62. ABA Database on Judicial Diversity, supra note 58. In 20 I 0, North Dakota

and Rhode Island reported zero judges of color, down from 2.1 % and 7.4%,
respectively, in 2008. Admittedly, this may represent only one to two judges, who may
have retired. Maine, Montana, New Hampshire, Vermont and Wyoming remained at
0%.
1 63. Id. California's percentage of judges of color increased from 1 0.6% to 23%;
New Mexico's from 1 6.2% to 30%.
1 64. ABA Database on Judicial Diversity, supra note 58.
1 65. See generally ABA Database on Judicial Diversity, supra note 58; I THE
AMERICAN BENCH, supra note 57.
1 66. State & Country Quick Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU {Mar. 1 7, 201 4, 9:53 PM)
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/OOOOO.html.
1 67. Lindsay M. Howden & Julia A. Meyer, Age and Sex Composition: 2010
Census Briefs, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 2 {May 20 1 1), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/cen20 I 0/briefs/c20 I 0br-03.pdf.
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minority" state, states such as Iowa, Maine, and West Virginia are
composed of a population that is over 90% White. The tables below reflect
these statistics.
Table 3t168
Racial Breakdown of Judges on the State Bench
Race

Population

State Bench

Non-Latina/o
White

63%

9 1 s.7%
( 1 5 ,939)

People of Color

37%

8.3%
( 1 s,436)

Total

100%

1 00%
( 1 7,375)

Table 4

1 69

Gender Breakdown of Judges on the State Bench
Gender

Population

State Bench

Women

50.9%

27%
(4,693)

Men

49.s1 %

73%
( 12,682)

Total

1 00%

1 00%
( 1 7,375)

White men constitute about 31 % of the population. However, they
represent more than double this number in terms of state judges at 67. 9%
168. State & Country Quick Facts, U. S. CENSUS BUREAU (Mar. 1 7, 20 14, 9:53 PM)
http://quickfacts.census.gov/q fd/states/00000.html; 1 THE AMERICAN BENCH, supra
note 57 (2012) (including 201s1 data representing 20 IO); and ABA Database on Judicial
Diversity, supra note 58.
169. 2010
Census
Briefs,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU
(May
2011),
http://www.census.gov/prod/cen20 I 0/briefs/c20 I0br-03.pdf; I THE AMERICAN BENCH,
supra note 57 (20 I2) (including 20 1 1 data representing 20 I0).
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(rounded up).
Table 5

1 70

Racial and Gender Breakdown of Judges on the State Bench
Race/Gender

Population

Bench
(17,375)

White men

3 1 .0%

67.88%
(11,794)

White women

3 2.0%

23.86%
(4,145)

Men of color

18.2%

5.11%
(888)

Women of
color

18.8%

3 .15%
(548)

Women and people of color are not just underrepresented on state
benches in comparison to their numbers in the general population but are
also underrepresented in terms of their numbers in the legal bar, a factor
that partially shapes the composition of the judiciary. For instance, in 201 0
171
Of
there were over a million lawyers in the United States (1 ,225,452).
1 2
these, women constituted 3 1 % of all lawyers, 7 and lawyers of color
1 73
1 2%,
as compared to 27% and 8.3% on the bench, respectively. It is
important to bear in mind that the judiciary is comprised of a very small
percentage of (the over one million) lawyers at 3% in 201 0, with the vast
170. Age and Sex Composition: 2010 Census Briefs, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (May
2011), http://www.census.gov/prod/cen20 l 0/briefs/c20 I Obr-03.pdf.; 1 THE AMERICAN
BENCH, supra note 57 (2012) (including 2011 numbers which represent 2010); ABA
Database on Judicial Diversity, supra note 58.
171. 2010 LAWYER DEMOGRAPHICS, A.B.A. MKT. RESEARCH DEP'T., available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/marketresearch/PublicDocumen
ts/lawyer_demographics_2011.authcheckdam.pdf.
172. A Current Glance at Women in the Law 201 1, AM. BAR Ass'N COMM'N ON
WOMEN
IN
THE
PROFESSION
(Jan.
2011),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aha/marketing/women/current_glance_statisti
cs_201 l.authcheckdam.pdf.
173. Lawyer Demographics, supra note 1 71.
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majority of lawyers employed in private practice. 174 As such, there are
more than enough women and lawyers of color to take advantage of the
opportunities to serve the public as judges. 175
However, regarding disciplinary actions, the analysis generally turns
away from using the overall population as a point of comparison to
comparing the incidence of disciplinary action to the actual percentages of
judges sitting on the bench. Here the database used contains 1,263 judges
disciplined from 2002 to 2012. In any given year, over the eleven years
studied, the number of judges disciplined constituted less than 1% of all the
judges on the state bench.176 Consequently, the study deals with relatively
small numbers because the number of judges disciplined is small. It is in
this context that the study finds racial, ethnic and gender disparities.
B. Methodfor Constructing the Database and Limitations ofStudy
1. Foundation ofDatabase
In constructing the database used in this study, we relied on the
American Judicature Society (AJS) database of state judicial discipline case
summaries. 177 The AJS database contains some 4000 cases. 178 However,
many of the cases represent a single individual case that carried over into
multiple years. 1 79 It also includes a number of First Amendment cases that
grew out of discipline cases.1 80 The team eliminated all duplicate cases and
1 74. Id.
1 75. See generally id.

1 76. CYNTHIA GRAY, A STUDY OF STATE JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE SANCTIONS 149
(2002) (making a similar point).
1 77. AJS Case Summaries Database, supra note 43.
1 78. Id.
1 79. For instance, on November 20, 2002, the Arkansas Judicial Discipline and
Disability Commission issued a letter of admonishment to Judge Wendell L. Griffen
for violating the Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct by delivering a speech on March
18, 2002, before the Arkansas Legislative Black Caucus in which the Judge criticized
the University of Arkansas and other institutions of higher learning for the lack of
people of color among their faculties, staffs and students, and urged the legislators to
vote against additional appropriations for the schools. On appeal, the Supreme Court of
Arkansas quashed the admonishment in late 2003. However, in the interim, the Judge
had filed a complaint in federal district court challenging the constitutionality of the
admonishment. The federal court abstained from rendering a ruling dismissing the
complaint on a motion to dismiss. Thus this case involves three cases and was reported
in two consecutive years in the AJS database. See Griffen v. Judicial Discipline and
Disability Commission, 130 S.W.2d 524 (Arkansas 2003); Griffen v. Judicial
Discipline and Disability Commission, 266 F. Supp. 2d 898 (U.S. District Court E.D.
Arkansas 2003). This however, was not the end of the story. See infra note 177.
1 80. For instance, Arkansas Judge Wendell Griffen again was charged with various
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all constitutional cases from the database, even though we noted when a
case was reported and appeared in multiple years. Finally we eliminated
some judicial election campaign cases, which did not involve sitting judges
(mostly in Nebraska). In the end, the team focused on the number of
individual judges subject to disciplinary actions, such that there were 1,263
judges whose disciplinary cases were included in the database. In other
words, the database contained 1,263 entries.
For each entry, the database included information on the year a judge's
case was finally resolved; the judge's first and last name; the state in which
the judge presided; the judge's racial/ethnic status (as well as "minority"
status), and gender status. The database also coded for the type of
misconduct charged, the number of charges (or commission findings), the
sanction imposed, if any, and whether or not administrative malfeasance
was a basis for a sanction (considered only in cases of removal). Thus, the
database plots a number of variables through which analyses could be
conducted. The database was constructed to also include information about
the number of years a judge had been on the bench, as an indication of
experience, the type of court in which the judge presided, and the number
of complaints. However, this information was ultimately not fully
collected and entered into the database.
AJS's case summary database provided a list of the twenty-six types of
misconduct for which judges are typically charged, as well as, a list of the
range of state imposed sanctions. The database constructed for this study
relies on these categories, as provided below.

violations of the Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct, more expansive than those with
which he had been charged in 2002 and 2003. These charges were based on public
statements and writings he authored criticizing the federal government's handling of
hurricane Katrina, the Iraqi war, the Presidential nomination of Justice Roberts for
Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, and certain anti-immigration and homophobic
statements of others. After a hearing for probable cause, the Arkansas Judicial
Discipline and Disability Commission granted his request for summary judgment and
dismissed the charges. See Griffen v. Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission
(Arkansas Supreme Court January 25, 2007) (granting request that the formal hearing
for probable cause be open to the public and the media); In re Griffen, Final Decision
and Order (Arkansas Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission September 27,
2007) (charges based on judges' statements dismissed). Out of this disciplinary case,
as before in 2003, several constitutional challenges were lodged in federal court, one of
which was reported in the AJS summary. See e.g. , Griffen v. Judicial Discipline and
Disability Commission (E.D. Ark. October 24, 2007) (challenging dismissed charges).
Because these types of constitutional challenges arise out of the disciplinary hearings
and represent the same case surrounding a single judge, they were eliminated from the
database.
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Judicial Misconduct: 1 8 1
1. Demeanor, Partiality, and Comments on the Bench
2. Presiding While Intoxicated
3. Ex Parte Communications
4. Disqualification
5. Failure to Follow the Law; Legal Error; Abuse of Discretion
6. Abuse of Contempt Power
7. Ticket-Fixing
8. Disagreements with Other Judges
9. On-Bench Abuse of Power; Favoritism
10. Sexual Misconduct
11. Administrative Failures/Treatment of Court Staff/Improper
Delegation
12. Using Court Resources for Personal Business
13. Delay; Diligence
14. Financial Disclosure Statements
15. Misrepresentations
16. Failure to Comply With Education Requirements
17. Conduct Unique to Part-Time Judges
18. Personal Conduct
19. Dishonest Conduct
20. Attempting To Obtain Favorable Treatment; Off-Bench Use of
Prestige of Office
21. Driving While Intoxicated (DWI)
22. Criminal Conduct
23. Campaign Conduct
24. Political Conduct Not Related to Judge's Own Judicial Campaign
25. First Amendment Challenges
26. Failure to Cooperate With Commission; Lying To Commission;
Asking Witness to Lie; Retaliating Against Complainant
27. Miscellaneous
28. Undisclosed
Judicial Sanctions: 1 82
A. Removal
B. Order to retire or resign in lieu of discipline
1 8 1 . See, e.g. , GRAY, supra note 1 40.
1 82. Id. at 9 1 -8.
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Removed or suspended for disability
Barred from serving in judicial office
Suspension without pay
Suspension
Publicly Censured
Publicly Reprimanded
Publicly Admonished
Public warning
Privately reprimanded or admonished
Advisory letter
Civil penalties/fine
Sanctioned in attorney discipline while judge

2. Challenges in Constructing the Database
The AJS Judicial Ethics Center database of judicial misconduct case
summaries was a goldmine; it compiles in one place the vast majority of
state judicial discipline cases and provides a synopsis of each. It proved
invaluable to this project. Nonetheless, constructing the database for the
purposes of this study proved arduous. The first challenge with working
with the AJS case summaries was that the summaries provided only the last
name of the judge and the state in which the case arose, presumably where
a judge presided. Often, the case summaries also provided a case cite,
which allowed us to go to any original published case. What this meant,
however, was that it was first necessary to go to each judge's individual
case or to a state's judicial website to find the first name of the judge. The
second challenge was that the case summaries, as organized, included
many references to a single case over multiple years, as discussed earlier.
These had to be whittled down in order to figure out just how many judges
were actually disciplined. 1 83
The third challenge of working with the AJS case summary database, as
explained, was that it neither provided the racial nor gender status of the
judges. This meant that we had to go to a host of other sources to try to
collect such information. This was extremely challenging, particularly with
regard to racial status. Sometimes the actual case mentioned a judge's
racial status, especially if bias was alleged in the complaint or was a feature
of the judge or another's response to the case. But in most cases, we were
reduced to combing biographical information to see if a judge self
identified as a person of color; combing state websites to see if they
contained reports that provided this information; calling the American Bar
Association and the National Council on State Judges, among other
183. AJS Case Summaries Database, supra note 43.
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organizations to see if they might have racial status information on a
particular judge; and, searching Judgepedia and the Internet generally for
mention of the judges on the list. The latter technique proved fairly
helpful.
Often, a judge's disciplinary proceeding had been covered by the media.
In this media coverage, it sometimes mentioned the judge's racial status
(particularly in cases where the judge was the first judge from his or her
ethnic or racial group on the bench) or the coverage provided a picture of
the judge. 1 84 Also, in election states, the media sometimes covered judicial
elections, providing biographical information or a picture of the judicial
candidate. 185 Assessing the racial status of a judge by his or her picture is
risky business. Unless we had some other corroborating evidence of a
judge's racial status, we categorized the judge as White. This occurred
more often in the case of African-American status.
Sometimes the initial evidence of a judge's race or ethnicity was simply
the name of the judge, particularly in the case of Latina/o/Hispanic
ethnicity. In order to corroborate these statuses, the team first combed the
ABA's directory on minority judges published in both 2001 and 2008.
This proved helpful. The team then turned to the various resources
provided through the Internet. Finally, there were still a number of judges
whose names hinted at Latina/o/Hispanic descent. Here we turned to the
states in which these judges presided and approached the state judicial
offices, as well as, minority or Latina/o/Hispanic bar associations in an
attempt to confirm a judge's status. Some of the states approached
included Arizona, 1 86 New Jersey, 1 87 New Mexico, 1 88 and Texas, 1 89 where
184. On several occasions it was the "comments" section on a particular media
article that allowed us to discover the racial status of a judge. So for instance, in a
search about a disciplined judge who we thought might be Latina/o/Hispanic, an
individual commented that he was waiting for the judge to "play the race card." In
another example, an entire diatribe against a judge in disciplinary proceedings appeared
on the website of a hate group. The writer referred to the judge as a "Black baboon"
among other things.
185. We found a couple of African-American judges through election campaign
electronic fliers or webpages.
186. Administrative
Services,
ARIZ.
JUDICIAL
BRANCH,
http://www.azcourts.gov/adminservices/Home.aspx (last visited May I, 20s14).
187. N.J. COURTS ONLINE, http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/ (last visited May 21,
A dvisory
Committee
on
Judicial
Discipline,
N.J.
COURTS,
2014);
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/acjc/ (last visited May 2 1, 2014) [Hereinafter Advisory
Comm. ] .

188. Whate's New?, N.M. COURTS: THE JUDICIAL BRANCH OF
http://www.nmcourts.com/index.php (last visited May 2 1, 2014); Welcome to
N.M.
COURTS:
THE
JUDICIAL
BRANCH
OF
Resources,
http://www.nmcourts.com/newface/hr/index.php (last visited May 2 1,

N.M.,

Human

N.M.,
20 14)
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large populations of people of Latina/o ethnicity reside. A number of these
also proved helpful.
For instance, personnel in both the New Mexico and Texas judicial
administrative offices were indispensable both in confirming judges'
statuses, but also in confirming a number of the team's assumptions. For
example, the Texas judicial staff reviewed the entire list we had compiled
of Texas judges who had faced disciplinary action. 190 Of those for whom
they had records and identified their racial/ethnic status, they confirmed
that the team had not made a single error in those it had identified as having
minority status. This helped to validate our research methods. Second,
they confirmed our suspicion that African Americans were likely
undercounted in the database. That is, the Texas administrative staff
identified two additional African American judges among those who had
been listed as "White" in the database. Third, their review confounded our
suspicion that Latina/o/Hispanics judges were likely over-counted in the
database because their review added two additional Latina/o/Hispanic
judges, along with one judge who identified as "other" (likely bi or multi
racial). In addition, the Texan staff identified another judge as either
Native American or Native Alaskan - all of whom were initially listed as
White judges who had faced disciplinary action.
Nevertheless, there still existed a handful of judges whose ethnicity
could not be fully confirmed. Here, unlike the practice used with reference
to African Americans and Asian Americans, the teamed used its best
judgment based on the evidence found in deciding in which category to
place a particular judge. For instance, a Judge Lopez listed in Wyoming
was classified as White because the ABA 2010 report listed Wyoming as
having no Latina/o/Hispanic judges on the bench at the time, a time when
he supposedly was a sitting judge.t19 1
Discerning the gender status of the judges proved much easier in part
because we could rely on the name of the judge. However, there are
gender-neutral names. A quick review of biographical information,
however, often revealed a particular judge as male or female, given the
references to "he" or "she."
The fourth challenge the team faced in both collecting for and analyzing
the information provided by the database was finding the overall numbers
for judges of color and women on the bench. As mentioned earlier, the
[Hereinafter Human Resources).
189. Court Structure of Texas, TEX. COURTS ONLINE, http://www.courts.state.tx.us/
(last visited May 16, 2014).
190. A special thanks again to Ms. Amanda Stities of Texas. Her assistance was
invaluable.
19 1. ABA Database on Judicial Diversity, supra note 58.
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American Bench directory has provided a gender report since 2006,
therefore this study includes solid overall numbers for women state judges
from 2005 through 2012. However, again, securing overall numbers of the
state judges of color for each year proved an almost impossible endeavor.
The ABA has periodically provided this information, although not
necessarily in an easily accessible form. So for instance, its publications on
minority judges includes federal judges, magistrates and a host of other
people in judicial positions, rendering the discernment of the number of
state court judges, at the general, intermediate, final, and limited
jurisdiction court levels, difficult. However, the updated ABA 2010 online
report, provided information on these issues, and it is this report, among
others, on which this study relies. 192
3. Limitations ofData and Analysis
There are several limitations to the study. First, the study focuses
attention only on the demographic factors of gender and race. In terms of
racial demographics, the study used two categories, one for minority status
(yes or no) and one for racial status in which a judge was identified as
African American/Black, Asian American, Latina/o/Hispanic and Other. 193
The latter category only represents two judges who were identified as
Native American/Alaskan or "Other." What this means is that although the
database takes "Others," including bi or multi-racial judges into account, if
identified, members of these groups are not separated out in the analysis.
Regarding gender, the database only reflects women and men, understood
in a traditional sense, and thus does not account for those judges who might
potentially identify as queer or transgender. Further, the database does not
account for sexual orientation; those who might identify as lesbian, gay,
bisexual, or transgender, though even the ABA expects the number of
lawyers who so identify to grow. 194
Second, it must be borne in mind that this is a national study. That is,
the study aggregates data from different states that have slightly different
disciplinary regimes, different levels of funding allocated to ferreting out
judicial misconduct, and different demographic profiles. As such, in some
sense and in some cases the analysis may well be comparing apples and
oranges and then aggregating them. At the same time, however, states
1 92. Id.

193. For ease, I refer to these groups as Black, Asian, Latina/a and Other. Latina/as
stands for both women and men of Hispanic ethnicity, "Latina" includes only women,
"Latino" includes only men.
1 94. Armstead, supra note 109, at 5 (noting "[o]ur country is becoming diverse
along many dimensions and we expect that the profile of LGBT lawyers and lawyers
with disabilities will increase more rapidly").
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share certain similarities. For instance, all fifty states have judicial
disciplinary processes, and they share a national culture and set of
institutional practices around gender, racial and ethnic disadvantage that
may contribute to the type of disparities found. As stated earlier,
disparities along these lines are ubiquitous in U.S. society.
Third and importantly, the database and the study, in discussing
sanctions, does not account for the number of complaints lodged against a
judge, the experience or age of a disciplined judge, the elected as opposed
to appointed status of a judge, the size of the court in which the judge sits,
or whether a judge has faced previous disciplinary action. Each of these
perimeters may be important in comparing the incidence of disciplinary
actions, the harshness of the sanctions imposed and whether disparities
really exist. As such, this paper represents a first pass on the question of
disparities in judicial discipline cases. The data presented is raw and fairly
straight forward and thus will benefit from more sophisticated statistical
and other analyses in order to determine the full extent of the disparities, as
well as causation.
That said, however, the state of California's commission on judicial
performance conducted a statistical study on judicial discipline in the state
for the years of 1990 through 2009. 195 This study examined several of these
variables including judicial experience, age, and number and source of
complaints. It found that although the number of complaints per judge had
decreased slightly over this period, the number of sanctions imposed had
declined significantly. 196 Equally important, an earlier version of the
California study suggested that the factors listed above, including the
number and source of complaints surprisingly did "not appear related to the
incident of discipline." 197
195. Summary of Discipline Statistics 1 990-2009, State of Cal. Comm'n on Judicial
available
at
Performance,
http://cjp.ca.gov/res/docs/miscellaneous/Statistical_Report_ 1 990-2009.pdf [Hereinafter
California Summary of Discipline Statistics 1 990-2009]. See California Summary of
Discipline Statistics 1 990- 1 999, State of Cal. Comm'n on Judicial Performance,,
available at http://cjp.ca.gov/res/docs/Miscellaneous/Statistical_study_ 1 990- 1 999.pdf
(noting that only disciplinary cases involving trial and appellate court judges were
reported and that the study did not include subordinate judicial officers).
196. California Summary of Discipline Statistics 1 990-2009, supra note 195.
197. Summary of Discipline Statistics 1990-2009, State of Cal. Comm'n on Judicial
Performance (March 22, 20 1 1 ) (on file with author and an earlier version of the
California Summary of Discipline Statistics 1 990-2009). [Hereinafter March 201 1
California Report]. But see, California Summary of Discipline Statistics 1990-2009,
supra note 195, at I 0- 1 1 (noting the following on age and experience: "[O]ver the long
run, the incidence of misconduct is relatively equally distributed across all experience
levels. There is a consistently increasing relationship between age and the discipline
rates from 2000 to 2009, but the combined decade rates suggest that age does not have
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The California study also examined a number of other variables,
including gender, in trying to determine its relationship to the incidence of
disciplinary action (the report did not examine the relation of racial or
ethnicity status to the incidence of discipline). 1 98 Regarding complaints,
the earlier report found that "male and female judges received
approximately [an] equal [number of] complaints per judge." 199 However,
the commission found that female judges received less discipline [than
men] per complaint.200 Again, our data suggested similar kinds of results.
As compared to their representation on the state bench, we found that
women were less often disciplined than their representation on the bench
might suggest, significantly so.201 However, this held true nationally only
for White women. Women of color encountered a higher incidence of
discipline relative to their representation on the bench, as did men both of
color and White.202
Finally, the California Commission also tested for several other
parameters including whether the judge had been initially elected as
opposed to appointed; whether the judge sat on a small court; and whether
the judge had previously received discipline.203 These factors indeed
appeared to be related to the incidence of disciplinary action.204 That
judges who were initially elected appeared to have an higher incident of
disciplinary cases, might well be seen as support for the proposition that
merit-based or appointive systems better screen for the value of quality in
judges; quality both in terms of integrity and impartiality but also perhaps
in terms of certain characteristics, such as knowledge of the law and
temperament (facets that the public may not adequately ascertain). 205
Here we did not include these factors in any consistent way. However,
the Texas judicial administrative office did provide information on the
level of court on which judges served. One notable factor that came out of
this information that relates to responsibilities which may occasionally
relate to court size was that a significant number of justices of the peace,
a large influence on discipline").
198. California Summary of Discipline Statistics 1990-2009, supra note 195, at 5.
199. March 2011 California Report supra note 197.
200. Id. at 8.
201. See infra notes 211-13 and accompanying text (discussing gender disparities).
202. See infra notes 214-16, 234-43 (showing that women of color were disciplined
at a higher rate (relative to their representation on the bench) than both white female
and white male judges, but lower than those of judges of color who were men and it is
their extremely high removal and resignation rates that are striking.).
203. See California Summary of Discipline Statistics 1990-2009, supra note 195.
204. Id.
205. K.O. Myers, supra note 128, at 46.
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some 30%, had been subject to disciplinary action. And, the three judges
removed from Texas during the period of study were justices of the peace.
In Texas, as in New York and a few others states, some justices of peace or
village or small town judges may not be lawyers.206 Legal training or
knowledge of the law may thus be an important source of quality control.
Though we would not necessarily expect the decisions, trends, and
practices in California to track well across the nation, that they comport
with a number of our findings lends support to the idea that states may have
more similarities than it might first appear. Thus, some of these trends may
in fact track for the entire nation.
Regarding limitations of the database specifically, as alluded to earlier,
the database may be under-incisive in terms of the number of actual
African Americans represented and slightly over-inclusive with regard to
Latina/os. Further, although the AJS database of case summaries is quite
comprehensive, it is likely that it may not account for all judicial discipline
cases and in translating the case summaries into a searchable database, the
team no doubt made some mistakes that we have yet to find.
IV. REPRESENTATION, DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL
As mentioned earlier, the judiciary at the state level remains
overwhelmingly White and male. Therefore, it is not surprising, that non
Latina/o Whites and men represent the highest percentage of those subject
to disciplinary proceedings. The total number of judges subject to
disciplinary action between the years 2002 and 2012 was 1,263. In terms
of racial identity, as the table below indicates, 1,115 of these judges were
White (88.3%), in comparison to 148 judges of color or 11.7% of the
disciplinary pool. In terms of gender, those subject to disciplinary action
were comprised of 1,018 men and 245 women, 80.6% and 19.4%,
respectively.

206. ORA Y, A STUDY OF STATE JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE SANCTIONS, supra note 176.
This was a national study on the discipline cases collected by AJS from 1990-2002. It
sought to provide guidance on judicial sanctions in order that they might be more
uniform, consistent and fair.
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Table 6207
Discipline Pool by Race/Ethnicity and Gender
Gender

Total

Judges of
Color
(JOC)

White

F

245

45

200

M

1018

103

915

Total

1263

148

In addition, 120 judges were removed between 2002 and 2012.
A. Race and Ethnicity
As the table below indicates, White judges comprise 91.7% of the state
bench and the majority of those disciplined. Their incidence of discipline
relative to their presence on the bench is 7.0%. In addition, of all White
judges disciplined, only 9.2% face the harshest sanction of removal.208

207. This table represents the information compiled and organized in the database,
hereinafter referred to as the Judicial Discipline Database. The information is based on
the AJS Case Summaries Database, supra note 43 (on file with author). There are a
total of 1,263 judges in database, of which 245 are women and 1,018 are men; and, 148
judges of color and 1115 White judges. There are 45 women judges of color; 200
White women judges; 103 judges of color who are men; and, 915 White judges who
are men.
208. However, White judges have a higher incidence of resignations at 12.2% as
compared to JOC, at 9.5%.
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Table 7209
Discipline and Removal by Race/Ethnicity

Race/
Ethnicity

Population National State Bench
( 1 7,375 judges total)

Incidence of Removals
Disciplinary
Actions

White

63%

9 1.7%
( l 5,939/1 7,375)

7.0%
( 1 t1t1 5/
1 5,939)

9.1 %
( 1 0 1 / 1 t1 5)

People of
color

37%

8.3%
( 1 436/1 7,375)

1 0.3%
( 148/1 436)

1 2.8%
( 1 9/ 1 48)

Judges of color (JOC), by contrast and as indicated earlier, comprise 37% of
the country's population, but only represent 8.3% of judges on state
benches. That is, they are vastly underrepresented by about 78%.
However, although they are vastly under-represented on state benches they
are over-represented in disciplinary proceedings. That is, the incident of
judicial action involving judges of color relative to their presence on the
state bench is 10.3%. Thus, the incidence of discipline for judges of color
is significantly higher than those of White judges. In addition, once
disciplined, the incidence of removal is 12.8%.
Briefly breaking down the data by group, as JOC only constitute 8.3% of
the bench, it is not surprising that the representation of the groups that
comprise the JOC category are numerically small. Asian, Blacks, Latina/o,
and Other Americans represent a mere 1%; 4.4%; 2.3%, and 0.6%, of the
judges on the state bench.

209. State & Country Quick Facts, U.S. CENSUS B UREAU (Mar. 1 7, 2014, 9:53 PM)
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html; I THE AMERICAN B ENCH, supra
note 57 (including 201t1 numbers which represent 20 10); ABA Database on Judicial
Diversity, supra note 58; Judicial Discipline Database.
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Table 82 1 0
Discipline and Removal Broken Down by Racial Subgroups
Groups

Asian

Black

Latina/o

Other

Total JOC

White

State Bench
( 1 7,375)

1%
( 1 57)

4 . 4%
(769)

2.3%
(408)

0.6%
( 1 02)

8.3%
( 1 4 36)

9 1 .7%
( 1 5939)

Incidence of
Discipline

6. 4%
( 1 0)

9.2%
(7 1 )

1 5.9%
(65)

0.02%
(2)

1 0.3%
( 1 48)

7 .05
( 1 1 1 5)

Removal

0.0%

1 9. 7%
( 14)

7.7%
(5)

0.0%

1 2.8%
( 1 48)

9. 1 %
(101)

respectively; as compared to the 91.7% of White judges on the bench.
Second, it is the high incident of discipline of both Black (9.2%) and
Latina/o judges (15.9%) that drive the disparities between White judges
(7.0%) and JOC generally (10.3%). Finally, Asian judges have a lower
incidence of discipline than do White judges (6.3% as compared to 7.0%),
given their presence on the bench. In terms of removal, it is the Black
judges' numbers that are striking. Of the 71 Black judges subject to
disciplinary action, 19.7% were removed, as compared to 1115 white
judges similarly subject, of whom 9.1% were removed. A Black judge who
faced disciplinary action was more than twice as likely than a white judge
so subject, to be removed.
B. Gender
Men generally are more often disciplined than are women, even as they
are over-represented on the state bench at 73%.2 1 1 In other words, they are
over-represented on the state bench and over-represented among those
disciplined. Men's incidence of discipline relative to their presence on the
bench is 8.0%. And of all the men disciplined, 9.7% were removed.
Women, in contrast, comprise 50.8% of the population, but only
represent 27% of state judges. That is, they are under-represented by about
2 1 0. I THE AMERICAN BENCH, supra note 57 (including numbers for 201 1 ,
representing 20 I O); ABA Database on Judicial Diversity, supra note 5 8 (providing data
on people of color broken down by groups); Judicial Discipline Database, supra note
207.
2 1 1 . Men are 49.2% of the population.
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47% , although that number is declining. Not only are women under
represented on the bench, they are also under-represented among those
disciplined, relative to their presence on the bench, at 5.2%. Their incident
212
of removal relative to all women disciplined was 8 .6%.
The reality that women are under-represented in terms of discipline
comports with the findings of a California study. That study too found that
women were disciplined less often than men. In California the lower
incidences of discipline were not related to a fewer number of complaints
against women as compared to men, nor did they correspond to markedly
different conduct in which women or men might have engaged. Rather , the
investigators concluded that women were simply disciplined less often.
Table nine suggests that women are not only less often disciplined than are
men but may also be less severely sanctioned than are men, though further
scrutiny suggests otherwise.
Table 9

213

Discipline and Removal by Gender
Gender

Population

State Bench
Nationally
( 1 7s 375 j udges
total)

Incidence of
Discipline

Removals

Women

50.8%

27.0%
(4,693/ 1 7,375)

5.2%
(245/4,693)

8.6%
(2 1 /245)

212. Women though, have a higher incident of resignations at 15.5% than do men at
11%. Of this group, White women have an incident of resignation at 15%, women of
color at 17.8%.
213. See Age and Sex Composition: 2010 Census Briefs, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU
(May 2011 ), http://www.census.gov/prod/cen20 I0/briefs/c20 I0br-03.pdf; see also
State & Country Quick Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Mar. 17, 2014, 9:53 PM)
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html.http://www.census.gov/prod/cen20 I
0/briefs/c2010br-03.pdf. I THE AMERICAN BENCH, supra note 157 (including 201 1
which represents data for 20 I0). Judicial Discipline Database, supra note 207. The
chart reads, for example, as follows: Women comprise 50.8% of the US population but
they only comprise 4693 or 27.0% of the 17375 j udges on the state bench (4693/17375
= 27.0%). Of the 4693 women judges on the state bench (using 20 IO as base year),
245 were disciplined or 5.2% (245/4693 = 5.2%) ; and of the 245 disciplined, 21 were
removed or 8.6% (2sis/245 = 8.6%).
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49.2%

8.0%
( I O 1 8/12,682)

73.0%
(12,682/
17,375)

9.7%
(99/1018)

However, the California study did not consider race as a factor, and as
such did not consider whether women of color shared in this circumstance.
According to our data, this finding for "women" did not hold for women of
color, a matter to which we turn next.
C. Intersectional Identity
Table ten parses the data out by race and gender. It illustrates that the
percentage of White men sitting on the bench at 67.9% is more than double
their representation in the general population. Their incidence of discipline
relative to their presence on the bench is 7.8%. Men of color, by contrast,
only represent 5.1% of those on the bench, and yet their incidence of
discipline relative to their presence is 11.6%, a significant difference as
compared to White men. Further, although 9.7% of all men disciplined
were removed; 10. 7% of male judges of color were removed as compared
to 9.6% of White male judges.
Table 102 1 4
Intersectional Identity and Removal
Race/Gender

Population

State Bench
(17,375 judges
total)

Incidence of
Discipline

Removal

214. Age and Sex Composition: 201 0 Census Briefs, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (May
2011), http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c20l 0br-03.pdf; see also State &
Country Quick Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Mar. 17, 2014, 9:53 PM)
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/OOOOO.html.The State Bench numbers are taken
from the gender report of The American Bench 2012, supra note 157 and ABA
Database on Judicial Diversity, supra note 58 (for women j udges of color). The data
on discipline was taken from the Judicial Discipline Database, supra note 207. The
chart reads, for example, as follows: White men comprise 31% of the US population
but they comprise 67.9% or 11794 of the 17375 judges on the state bench
(11794/17375 = 67.99%). Of the 11794 white male judges on the state bench (using
2010 as base year), 915 or 7.8% were disciplined (915/11794 = 7.8%); and of the 915
disciplined, 88 or 9.6% were removed (88/915 = 9.6%).
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White men

3 1 .0%

67.9%
( 1 1,794)

7.8%
(91 5)

9.6%
(88)

White women

32.0%

23.85
(4,t1 45)

4.8%
(200)

6.5%
(13)

Men of color

1 8.2%

5.1%
(888)

1 1 .6%
(103)

10.7%
( 11)

Women of color

18.8%

3.15%
(548)

8.2%
(45)

17.8%
(8)

In exammmg White women, specifically, it becomes clear that the
percentages of White women disciplined and removed pulled the total
numbers down for the entire "women" category, as well as the "White"
category. In fact, their numbers were markedly lower than their
representation on the bench. Though White women represent 23.85% of
those on the bench, their incidence of discipline, relative to their presence
on the bench, was a low 4.8%, and only 6.5% of them were removed.2 1 5
However, the conclusion in the California report that "women" judges
were disciplined less often than men and the idea that they may also be less
severely sanctioned in relation to men did not necessarily hold up for
women of color in this study. Women of color, who represent a mere
3.15% of state judges, had a high incidence of discipline relative to their
representation on the state bench, at 8.2%. That is, they had an even higher
incidence of discipline than did White women and White men but a lower
incidence of discipline than did men of color, relative to their presence on
the bench.
But · more startling, women of color had a significantly higher presence
among those removed from the bench, both in relation to their already high
incidence of discipline and their presence on the bench but also in relation
to the other groups disciplined. A shocking 17.8% of women of color were
removed. This compares with an incidence of removal of 10.7% for men
of color; 9.6% for White men; and 6.5% for White women. A woman of
color who faced disciplinary action was almost twice as likely to have her
case end in removal, than were men and almost three times more likely
than were White woman.2 16 And, it appears that it is the removal of women
2 1 5. However, White women have a hi gher incident of resi gnations at 1 5% than do
White men at 1 1 %, but lower than women of color at 1 7.8%.
2 1 6. In addition, women of color have a high incidence of resi gnation at 17 .8%.
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of color that drives the removal disparity between judges of color and
White judges.
Finally, women of color also had the highest incidence of recorded
resignations relative to their incidences of discipline.217 However, White
women also had a high incidence of resignations; a finding that cast doubt
on the notion that White women are less severely sanctioned than are men.
These findings and others are explored in more detail below.
V. OBSERVATIONS ON SANCTIONS, CHARGES, AND MISCONDUCT TYPE
ACROSS GENDER & RACE
A. A Deeper Look at the Distribution ofSanctions
The previous section provided a picture of the state bench's composition
and the disparities that exist in disciplinary actions between judges of color
and White judges. It also provided a picture of the discipline disparities
between men and women judges. Although men in general face a higher
incidence of disciplinary actions than do women and there exist disparities
between male judges of color and White male judges, some of the largest
disparities between cases involving White judges and judges of color in
general, and particularly in the severity of sanctions, are driven by
proceedings against women of color.
This section seeks to dig deeper into these numbers and the factors that
may in part account for some of these disparities. In addition to reiterating
the notion that disciplinary proceedings against women of color
significantly contribute to the disparities between judges of color and
White judges generally, it finds that women in general, including White
women, leave the state bench pursuant to disciplinary action at higher rates
than do all men.
At the same time, this section asks, what might the numbers reveal about
the imposition of sanctions, the charges brought and the conduct penalized.
Said differently, sanctions are not simply imposed, they are imposed in
response to charges made and found about violations of certain codes of
judicial behavior or otherwise. Thus this section also seeks to provide a
fuller picture of the range of sanctions available to states and the ways in
which different groups fare under them. It then briefly explores what, if
any, impact the number of charges or findings has on the severity of the
sanction imposed. And finally it explores, with a broad brush, the impact
the nature of the conduct has on the type of sanction imposed.
2 1 7. However, because an agreed-to resignation may occur before charges are filed,
it could be that the majority of resignations instigated by disciplinary investigations are
not recorded.
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I. Sanctions and Tier Analysis
a. Overview of Sanctions
In terms of sanctions, this study employed the fourteen categories of
sanctions identified by the AJS. This list is a compilation of the various
sanctions states use. Thus, few, if any states, use all of these sanctions.218
However, all states have a removal process, which generally follows a
formal hearing in which a judge has been found to have engaged in
misconduct.2 19 It is the harshest sanction that a state can mete out to a
judge, and its harshness is reinforced, in part, because it usually engenders
wide public attention. The next level of sanction, resignations involves an
agreement between the state and the judge that the judge will resign, often
in lieu of further proceedings - a sanction that may avoid some of the
attention generated by removal pursuant to a formal hearing. These
resignations are more numerous than the pool here suggests because they
may occur before any formal charges are brought. Finally there is removal
for disability, or an order or agreement that the judge will never serve again
in a judicial capacity. Most states have these sanctions, all of which result
in the loss of the judicial commission and thus the judge leaving the
bench.220
Most states also have the authority to suspend a judge without pay. This
comes with its own hardships as suspensions also tend to gamer significant
public attention but also render a judge potentially income-less for a period
of time. Although most suspensions in this study were for 60 to 90 days,
they can be for much longer periods, 22 1 and being without an income even
for 60 days may be a significant hardship.
In addition, all states have some form of public reprimand. It may occur
under several different names and a state may have more than one level.
These names are censure, reprimand, public admonishment and public
waming.222 All of these are used and ranked in this study following the
218. See Cynthia Gray, Judicial Conduct Commissions: How Judicial Conduct
Commissions Work, 28 JUST. SYS. J. 405, 415-16 (2007). See also e.g., California
Summary of Discipline Statistics 1990-1999, supra note 201, at ! (listing the following
sanctions: "advisory letters, public and private admonishments, public reprovals [this
eliminated in 1995], public censures and decisions"). See Def. Summation, In re
Campbell, No. ACJC 2008-317 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Dec. 30, 2009), available at
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/pressrel/ACJC%20Campbell%20Closing%20Brief.pdf.
219. Gray, supra note 219.
220. Id. at 416. Removal for disability may not carry the same sort of stigma, and
presumably a judge continues to retain his judicial title after leaving office.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 414.
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lead of AJS. Finally, there are a number of private sanctions, some of
which never become public.223
The most commonly used public sanction by states, as this study
demonstrates, is a form of the reprimand. Because a state likely does not
use all the different forms of public reprimands - censure, reprimand,
admonishment and warning - for the purposes of this study, two sets of
reprimands have been assumed. Further, the sanctions have been divided
into a 5-Tier ranked system to facilitate analysis.
b. Tier Analysis
This study provides the data for all of the fourteen sanctions listed.
However, it also provides a tier analysis. In the tier analysis, this study
combines and reduces the various possible state sanctions into just five
levels or tiers. Doing so facilitates analysis by making the information
easier to grasp. It may also more realistically capture the choices states
make given that most states use fewer sanctions than listed.
The first tier includes the harshest sanctions resulting in the loss of the
judicial commission, including removal orders ("A"), forced retirement/
resignation agreements ("B"), and the combined category of disability
removal/barred from serving in a judicial capacity ("C/D"). The latter
category, "CID" only represents ten records and therefore does not feature
prominently in the analysis. The second tier only includes suspension
("E") in part because of the unique hardships suspension engenders in the
temporary loss of income. The third tier includes the public censure ("G")
and public reprimand ("H"); presumably a harsher public condemnation of
misconduct than the next level of public reprimand. The fourth tier includes
the public admonishment ("I") and the public warning ("J"); presumably a
milder form of disapproval. Finally, the various private warnings and
actions comprise tier five as "K," "L," "M," "N" and "P."
One of the disadvantages of the tier approach is that it in some ways both
masks and reduces the significance of removals because it combines it with
other sanctions. An advantage of the approach is that it brings into focus
resignations and other sanctions, which also have the effect of forcing
judges to leave the bench. These advantages and disadvantages affect the
analysis of cases involving Black Judges and Latina/o judges, in particular,
differentially and is an important part of the story surrounding people of
color as a group.

223. Some states report private actions by simply noting and thus acknowledging
that they occur.
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2. Distribution of Sanctions: Racial/ Ethnic and Gender Group
Comparisons
a. Racial/Ethnic Group Distributions
The paper thus far primarily has considered the misconduct pool broken
down between two groups white judges and judges of color on the one
hand and men and women judges on the other. The numbers at this level of
analysis are likely statistically significant. However, this section further
breaks down the judges of color category into its constituent groups (Black,
Latina/o, Asian and Other). These numbers tend to be too small (often
single digits) to render statistically meaningful statements and consequently
constitute mere observations about the pool. Further, as mentioned earlier,
the findings representing the comparison between even judges of color and
White judges reveal disparities, not causation.
Table 11 displays the data for the different judges of color groups. At
first glance it becomes clear that cases against White judges form the
majority of the pool, 1115 judges out of 1263 (88.3%). Second, Black and
Latina/o judges comprise the largest groups of judges of color, with
seventy-one and sixty-five cases, respectively. Further, for Black and
Latina/o judges, some of their highest numbers are concentrated at the top
of the table and then again in the middle of the table. This is not so terribly
different from the cases of White judges. Finally, for Black and Latina/o
judges, if the top three categories of sanctions are combined, they have the
exact same numbers of cases, 1 7, though this number represents a higher
percentage of the Latina/o pool.
Among the groups, Black judges, however, appear to face the toughest
sanctions. That is, there is a higher concentration of cases involving Black
judges in the top half of the table, which represents the harshest sanctions.
For instance, the highest percentage of removal cases involve Black judges
at 19.7%, even though there is both a higher percentage and a larger
number of Latina/o judges who resigned than any other group. Further, the
highest percentage of those judges suspended are Black. At the middle of
the table, there is a second concentration of most groups' cases around the
various reprimands. Again Black judges are more concentrated at the level
of censure, presumably a harsher sanction than the public reprimand and
admonishment where a higher percentage of Latina/os and White judges
are sanctioned. This division becomes more distinct in the data on women
of color.

20 1 4 ]
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Distribution of Sanctions by Racial/ Ethnic Group
B lack Latina/o

Asian

Other

9.5%
( 1 20)

0%

0%

Resignation
"B "

1 1 .9%
( 1 50)

0%

0%

Disability;
Disbarment "Cl
D"

0.8%
( 1 0)

0%

0%

Suspension
"E" and "F"

1 1 .00%
( 1 39)

1 0%
(1)

0%

Public
Censure
"G"

1 7.3%
(224)

1 0%
(1)

0%

Public
Reprimand
"H"

25.5%
(322)

30%
(3)

50%
(1)

Public
Admonishment "I"

1 1 .9%
( 1 50)

50%
(5)

0%

Public
warning

1 .6%
(20)

0.9%
( I 0)

6.8%
( 1 0)

1 .4%
(1 )

1 2.3%
(8)

0%

50%
(1 )

Private
" K"

4.5%
(57)

4.9%
55

1 .4%
(2)

1%
(1)

1 .5%
(1)

0%

0%

Sanctions

Total

Removal

"A"

"]"

White

0.8%
(9)

Total
Judges
of Color

0.7%
(1)

0%

224. Judicial Discipline Database, supra note 207.

1 .5%
(1)
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Advisory
Letter
"L "

1 .0%
( 1 2)

1.1%
( 1 2)

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

F ine
"M "

0.7%

0.8%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

Misc.
"N "

0. 1 %
(1)

0. 1 %
(1)

0%

1%
(1)

0%

0%

0%

Apology,
Regret,
Probation
" P"

0.7%

(9)

0.7%
(8)

0.7$
(1)

1%
(1)

0%

0%

0%

Dismissed/
No Sanction

3 .2%
(40)

0%

0%

Total
Actions

( 1263)

( 1 0)

(2)

(9)

(9)

(1 1 105)

( 1 48)

(7 1 )

(65)

Analyzing the information through the tool of the tier system teases out
some of these observations more precisely.
Table 1 2 below represents the tier analysis. It lists the tiers, which
combine the sanctions into groups, in the first column. The second column
provides the percentage of the entire pool each sanction represents. For
example, the database contains 1263 judge' s records, 280 of which
incurred a sanction of removal, resignation, or disability/disbannent. These
280 cases are 22.2% of the entire pool. The other columns represent the
different groups and the percentage of each group's cases that incurred the
sanctions listed in that row (relative to their presence in the disciplinary
pool), except for the judges of color (JoC) column. This column combines
the figures for all Asian, Black, Latina/o, or Other judges. The tier analysis
shows the distribution of cases within a particular racial or ethnic group
and provides two points of comparison; namely, comparisons between the
groups and a comparison of each group with the percentage of the pool that
received that particular sanction.

20 1 4 ]
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Table 1 2225
Tiers by Racial/Ethnic Group

Sanctions

Total
Pool

White

JOC

Black

Latina/

Asian

Other

0

I (A-D)

22.2%
(2 8 0 )

0.0%
(0 )

0.0%
(0 )

II (E/F)

1 1%
( 1 39)

1 0.0%
(1)

0.0%
( 0)

Ill ( G-H )

43.2%
( 546 )

40.0%
(4)

50.0%
(1)

IV (1-J)

1 3.5%
( 1 7 0)

12.1%
( 1 3 5)

23 .6%
(35)

(8)

50.0%
(5 )

50.0%
(1)

6.9%
(87)

7 .5%
(84)

2.0%
(3)

2. 8 %
(2 )

1 .5%
(1 )

0%
(0 )

0%
(0 )

3%
(33)

4.7%
(7)

8 .5%
(6)

1 .5%
(1 )

0%
( 0)

0%
(0 )

( 1 1 1 5)

( 1 4 8)

(7 1 )

(65 )

( 1 0)

(2 )

V (K-P)

No
3 .2%
Sanction
(4 0)
Dismissals
Total
Actions

( 1 263)

The analysis reveals a number of things about the relationship of the
sanctions to the groups and the groups to each other. First, the percentages
of cases involving White judges are closely related to the percentage of the
total pool because cases involving White judges comprise the
overwhelming majority of pool. Second, Black and Latina/a judges, with
23.9% and 26. 1 %, respectively, have the highest percentage of cases that
incur tier one sanctions-removal, resignation, and disability/disbarment
(relative to their incidence of disciple/presence in the discipline pool).
These percentages are higher than the percentage of tier one sanctions
incurred by cases involving White j udges, at 22%. Cases involving Asian
225. Id.
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and Other judges did not incur any tier one sanctions.
Analyzing the distribution of sanctions by group, a tier analysis reveals
the fact that Latina/o j udges have the highest percentage of cases incurring
tier one sanctions, relative to their presence in the pool. However, the
percentages of those Latina/o judges who incurred tier two and three
sanctions (the relatively harsh sanctions of suspensions, censures and
reprimands) are lower than the percentage of those incurred by either B lack
or White judges. In fact, the largest concentration of cases involving
Latina/o j udges were sanctioned at tier four, with 32.3%. That is, 32.3% of
Latina/o judges faced admonishments and warnings as compared to 1 3 .5%
of the entire pool at tier four (or well over two times the cases involving
Black and White judges). Thus, although Latina/o j udges have the highest
percentage of those who faced tier one sanctions, 6 1 % of the sanctions
imposed in cases involving Latina/o judges were imposed at the level of
tier three and tier four sanctions, which are milder than those found at the
top of the table.
At first glance, the highest concentration of cases against B lack j udges
incurred sanctions at tier three, censure and reprimand, at 38%. Upon
closer analysis, however, this concentration is equal to the percentage of
the combined percentages at tier one and two. In other words, 38% of the
cases instituted against B lack judges incurred sanctions of censures and
reprimands, and another 38% (23 .9% + 1 4 . 1 %) incurred sanctions of
removal, resignation and suspension, or tier one and two sanctions. These
cases constitute the highest percentages of any group among the harshest
sanctions meted out to judges. Further, the percentage of Black judges who
faced tier one and two sanctions was higher than the pool percentages in
both tiers; and the percentage of Black judges who incurred sanctions at the
lower levels (milder sanctions, tier four and five) were all lower than the
pool percentages for every level except where the case was dismissed or no
sanctions" were imposed.
With regard to Asian judges, 90% of the disciplinary actions instituted
against them incurred sanctions at tier three and tier four, with only 1 0% of
the cases ( 1 / 1 0) incurring a sanction at tier two, the suspension level.
Regarding "Other" judges, the two cases in the pool incurred sanctions at
tiers three and four.
As for the cases instituted against White judges, those cases incurred
sanctions lower than the pool percentages in every tier except tier three
( censures and reprimands), where the cases are concentrated and the
percentage was equal to the pool percentage, and in tier five sanctions
(private sanctions, advisory letters, etc.), the mildest sanctions, where the
percentage was slightly higher than the pool percentage. In fact, the
percentages of cases wherein White judges incurred tier one and tier two
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sanctions was lower than that of Black or Latina/o j udges, with White
judges incurring all of the milder sanctions at a higher percentage than
Black j udges, in particular, except for dismissals.
To the extent that cases involving Black and Latina/o j udges incurred
harsher sanctions, a gender analysis by group indicates the driving force
behind the disparity.

3. Distribution ofSanctions and Gender Comparisons by Group
a. Men by Racial/Ethnic Group
Table 1 3 provides the overall data on the cases involving men broken
down by racial groups. In brief, some of the patterns seen among the larger
groups of color (including women and men) seem replicated here, except
with smaller numbers. Further, as discussed earlier, male judges of color
have a higher incidence of removal than white male j udges, relative to their
presence on the bench. However, this is driven by the high incident of
removal for Black male j udges.
226
Table 1 3

Distribution of Sanctions of Men by Racial/ Ethnic Group227
Other
Men

9.7
(99)

0%

0%

Resignation
"B "

1 1%
( 1 12)

0%

0%

Disability
Disbarment
"CID"

0.7%
(7)

0%

0%

Suspension
" E"0&0"F"

1 1 .01 %
( 1 013 )

1 0%
(1)

0%

Public
Censure

1 7.5%
( 1 78)

1 0%
(1)

0%

Total

Removal "A "

226. Id.
227. Id.

White
Men

Total
Men
JOC

B lack
Men

Asia
n
Men

Sanctions

Latino
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" G"
Public
Reprimand

26.5%
(270)

27.2%
(249)

20.4%
(2 1 )

1 6.0%
(8)

26. 1
( 1 2)

1 0%
(l)

0%

Public
Admonishmen
t "I"

1 1 .4%
( 1 1 6)

1 0.8%
(99)

1 6.5%
( 1 7)

1 0.0%
(5)

1 9.6%
(9)

30%
(3)

0%

Public
Waming0'T'

1 .8%
( 1 08 )

1 .0%
(9)

8.7%
(9)

2.0%
(1)

1 5 .2%
(7)

0%

1 00%
(1)

Private "K"

5.1%
(52)

5.5%
(50)

2.0%
(2)

2.0%
(1)

2.2%
(1 )

0%

0%

Advisory
Letter "L "

I C¾
( 1 0)

1.1
( 1 0)

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

Fine "M"

0.6%
(6)

0.7%
(6)

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

Misc. "N "

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

Apology,
Regret,
Probation " P "

0.9%
(9)

0.9%
(8)

1%
(I)

2.0%
(1 )

0%

0%

0%

Dismissed
No sanction

2.8%
(28)

0%

0%

(6)

(])

Totals
Disciplinary
Actions/
Men/race

( 1 0 1 8)

(9 1 5 )

( 1 03)

(50)

(46)

However, a tier analysis, captured below in Table 14, reveals a number
of very interesting pieces of information. First, cases involving white men
-White male judges, not Black male or Latino judges-have the highest
percentage of those incurring tier one sanctions. This reiterates the point
that it is not cases involving Black male and Latino judges alone that are
driving the disparities with regard to the severity of penalties of j udges of
color as a group in comparison to White judges as a group. Rather, cases
involving women of color are contributing significantly to these disparities.
However, the tier approach muffles the significance of removal. Recall that
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the disparities between White men and men of color in terms of removal
was 9.6% and 1 0.7%, respectively and that black male judges had the
228
highest percentage of removals ( 1 4%).
Table 1 4229
Tiers by Group: Percentage of the men groups represented at each tier230
White
Men

MoC

B lack
Men

Tiers
(Sanctions)

Total
Pool

I (A-D)

2 1 0.4%
(2 1 8)

0%

II (E/F )

1 1.1 %
( 1 01 3)

0%

III (G-H )

44%
(448)

0%
(0)

IV (1-J)

1 3.2%
( 1 34)

1 00%
(1)

V (K-P)

7.6%
(77)

0%
(0)

No
Sanction
Dismissals

2 . 8%
(28)

0%
(0)

Total
actions

( 1 0 1 8)

(9 1 5)

( 1 03)

(50)

Latina/o

(46)

Asian
Men

(6)

Other
Men

(1)

Again, both Black male and Latino judges incur tier one sanctions lower
than white men, and consequently lower than the pool percentage (second
column). This means that overall, slightly fewer Black men and Latino
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
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j udges are leaving the bench than are judges who are White men.
However, j udges of color who are men incur higher levels of suspensions.
And as all but two of the of the seventeen cases that ended in suspension
against judges of color involve male judges, it is suspensions of male
judges of color, not women judges of color, which drive the suspension
disparity between White judges and judges of color. Cases involving Black
men have the highest percentage of suspensions.23 1 At the same time, the
percentage of cases involving j udges who are Black men continue to be
lower than the pool percentages at every tier level except for dismissals.
These lower tiers represent progressively milder sanctions.
The percentage of cases involving Latino judges, though representing a
high percentage, do not represent the highest percentage of those incurring
tier one level sanctions. Latino judges maintain lower percentages of cases
at every tier level except tier four-public admonishments and warnings
as did the entire Latina/a group (consisting of both women and men).
Cases involving Latino judges continue to be concentrated at tier three and
four sanctions, with the majority of tier three level cases incurring
reprimands as opposed to censures, as indicated by the data. 232
Regarding cases involving White men, not only do they have the highest
percentage of cases incurring tier one sanctions, they have a slightly higher
percentage of cases incurring sanctions at tier three. Otherwise like the
larger group of White judges, (including White women and White men) the
percentage of cases involving White male judges is lower than the
percentage pool at tiers two (suspensions) tier 4 (public warnings etc.) and
dismissals, and higher than the pool at tier five (private sanctions).
b. Women by Racial/Ethnic Group
Table 19 below provides the raw data on women. There are 245
disciplinary cases involving women, forty-five of which are women of
color. As discussed earlier, White women, in relation to their percentage
on the bench, have a lower incidence of discipline, as compared to women
of color, who in general have a higher incidence of discipline.233 Both the
higher incidence of discipline and severer sanctions in cases involving
women of color are predominantly comprised of cases involving Black
women and Latina judges. However, a quick glance at the table reveals
that despite the large percentages described below, the numbers,
particularly in the case of the individual groups constituting women of
color, are small; often single digits. Thus, although the cases involving
23 I. Id.
232. Id.
233. 4.8% as compared to 8.2%.
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Black women and Latina judges drive both the higher incidence of
discipline and, more critically, the disparities in the severity of punishment
between judges of color and White judges, much that is discussed below
are observations. That is, the numbers in many instances are not large
enough to make any definitive claims.
Returning to the severity and distribution of sanctions, the cases
involving Black women and Latina judges, as the table displays, in some
ways mirror each other with seven Black women and one Latina sanctioned
through removal, and seven Latinas and one Black woman forced to resign,
though the percentages are different given each groups relative presence in
the pool (incidence of discipline). A less clear but similar mirroring occurs
at the levels of censures, reprimands, and admonishment. In fact, similar to
the removal/resignation mirror where eight cases are involved in each
category, the more distorted mirroring at this level involves nine cases for
both groups. In both areas Black women faced the harshest penalty of
removal and censure, assuming censure is distinct from reprimands.
Finally each group has one case at the suspension level.
In terms of percentages, specifically and including white women judges,
Black women judges incur the highest percentage of removals relative to
their incidence of disciplines at 33.3% as compared to 6.5% for white
women and 5.3% for Latina judges. And, they also incur the highest
percentage of public censures at 28.6%. However, Latina judges incur the
highest percentage of resignations relative to their presence in the pool, at
36.8% as compared to 1 5% for White women and 4.8% of Black women
judges. White women judges have the highest percentage of suspensions
relative to their presence in the disciplinary pool and as compared to 5.3%
of Latinas and 4.8% of black women judges.
Table 1 5234
Distribution of Sanctions of Women by Racial/ Ethnic Group
Sanctions

Total

Removal
"A"

8.6%
(2 1 )

234. Id.

White
Female

B lack
Total
Female Female
Judges
of
Color

Latina

Asian
Other
Female Female

5.3%
(1)

0%

0%
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0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

5.3%
(1)

0%

0%

0%

0%

50%
(2 )

1 00%
(1)

2 1 . 1%
(4)

50%
(2 )

0%

0%

5.3%
(1)

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

1.0
(2)

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

1 .2%
(3)

1 .5%
(3)

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

Misc.
'"N "

0.4%
(1)

0%

2.2%
(1 )

4.8%
(1 )

0%

0%

0%

Apology,
Regret,
Probation
"P"

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

Dismissed

4.9%

0%

0%

Resignation
"B "

1 5.5
%
(3 8 )

4.8%
(1)

Disability
Disbarment
" C "0&0"D "

1 .2%
(3 )

0%

Suspension
" E" & "0F "

1 0.6
%
(26)

4.8%
(1)

Public
Censure

1 8.8
%
(46)

Public
Reprimand
"H "

2 1 .2
%
(52)

Public
Admonishment " I"

1 3.9
%
(34)

1 3 .0%
(26)

1 7.8%
(8 )

9.5%
(2 )

Public
Warning

2.0%
(2)

0.5%
(1)

2.2%
(1 )

Private
" K"

2.0%
(5 )

2.5%
(5 )

Advisory
Letter " L "

2.0%
(2 )

F ine
" M"

"G"

"J"

4.8%
(1 )
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No sanction.

( 1 2)

Totals
Disciplinary
Actions

(245 )

(200)

(45)

(2 1 )

(1 9)

(4)

Applying a tier analysis to the relationship between women groups and
sanctions, as captured below in Table 1 6, the analysis reveals that a
substantial percentage of the cases involving Latina and Black women
judges incurred tier one sanctions. Cases involving Latinas had the highest
percentage of tier one sanctions (42. 1 %), followed by those involving
Black women judges (38.1 %). These percentages are substantially higher
than the pool percentage (25.3%), higher than the percentage of White
women that incur these sanctions (23%), and higher than the percentage of
all male judges who incurred tier one sanctions.235
The percentages of cases involving Latina judges, like their Latino
counterparts, are below the pool percentages in tiers two, three, and five
and substantially higher than the pool percentages of tier four sanctions
representing admonishments and warnings. However, unlike the cases
involving their male counterparts, there is a slightly higher percentage of
Latina cases among those dismissed or where no sanctions were imposed
(this represents a single case).
Table 1 6236
Total
Pool

White
Women

Black
Women

Latina/o

Asian
Women

Other
Women

1 (A-D ) 25.3%
(62)

0%
(0)

0%
(0)

I I (E/F)

0%
(0)

0%
(0)

50%
(2 )

1 00%
(1)

III

H)

10.6%
(26)

(G- 40%
(98)

235. Id.
236. Id.

WoC

42%
(84)

31%
( 1 4)

33.3%
(7)

2 1.1%
(4)
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14.7%
(36 )

V ( K-P) 4.5%

( 1 1)

1 3 .5%
(27)

20%
(9)

9.5%
(2)

26.3%
(5)

50%
(2)

0%

5%
( 1 0)

2%
(1)

4.8%
(J)

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

(4)

(1)

No
4.9%
Sanction ( 1 2)
Dismiss
als
Total
actions

(245)

[Vol. 23.1

(200)

(45 )

(2 1 )

( 1 9)

As compared to B lack women judges, aside from both groups' notable
presence in cases incurring tier one sanctions, the next largest concentration
of cases involving Black women lay in tier three - censures and reprimands,
in contrast to Latina judges' cases, which concentrate in tier four. Even
though cases involving Latinas have a presence among tier three sanctions,
most of these cases incurred reprimands rather than censures, in contrast to
cases involving B lack women, assuming these sanctions are different.237
This is similar to cases involving White women as compared to Black
women judges. Cases involving White women, like those involving White
men are concentrated at tier three level sanctions. And White women
judges have a higher percentage of tier three cases than even judges who
are B lack women. However, cases involving Black women judges incurred
censure at a higher level than did White women judges, who have a slightly
higher percentage of tier four cases.m In fact, the percentage of cases
involving B lack woman judges are lower than the pool percentages for all
tiers except for the milder tier five sanctions (warnings and
admonishments) and dismissals.
Cases involving White women represent a lower percentage of tier one
sanctions as compared to both Black women and Latina judges. However,
this percentage is higher than those incurred among cases involving White
men, who have the highest percentage of tier one sanctions among men.
Although making a one to one comparison between women and men is
difficult, this datum challenges the notion that cases involving women in
general and White women in particular, are less severely sanctioned than
237. Id.
238. Id.
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those involving men. Admittedly, White women have a significantly lower
incidence of discipline and attract much lower levels of removals.239
However, when the three top sanctions are combined, cases involving
White women incur tier one sanctions at a slightly higher rate than White
men, 23.0% as compared to 21.9%, respectively, and consequently all
men.240 These data indicate that overall, women, including Black, Latina,
and White women judges, leave the bench at a higher rate than do judges
who are men.
In addition, the percentage of cases where White women incur tier two
sanctions, is higher than those involving Black women and Latina judges,
but is also higher than the percentage of cases against White male judges
who incur these sanctions. In other words, a higher percentage of White
women judges are suspended (12%) than are Latina judges (5.3%), Black
women judges (4.8%), and White male judges (10.7%), though lower than
the percentage of Black male judges suspended (18.0%).241
Asian women judges' cases are concentrated in tiers three and four,
similar to the Asian male judges. And, the one Other woman judge's case
incurred a tier level three sanction while the one man categorized as Other
incurred a tier four sanction.
In summary, a higher percentage of cases involving women of color
incur the harshest sentences, resulting in them disproportionately leaving
the bench. Furthermore, these harsh sentences in part drive the disparities
between judges of color and Whites. Among women of color, cases
involving Black women incur the highest percentage of the harshest
sanction, removal. However, Latina judges are losing their judicial
commissions through resignations in almost equal measure, constituting a
tier one sanction. The lower percentage of cases involving White women
that incur severe sentences masks the tough sanctions imposed on women
of color. Yet, White women in this sample are not necessarily less severely
sanctioned than are judges who are men. In fact, White women judges are
forced to leave the bench at a higher rate than male judges generally,242
239. Compare Table 13: Distribution of Sanctions of Men by Racial/ Ethnic Group,

with Table 1 5: Distribution of Sanctions of Women by Racial/ Ethnic Group.

240. Compare Table 14: Tiers by Group: Percentage of the Men Groups
Represented at Each Tier, with Table 16: Tiers by Group: Percentage of the Women
Groups Represented at Each Tier.
241. The key to this puzzle with regard to tier one sanctions is that although Latina
judges have the highest rate of forced resignations (38.6%), White women resign more
often than White male judges (15% as compared to 1 1.6%). White men judges have the
highest resignation rate among men.
242. 23.0% of White women judges as compared to 21.4% of judges who are men.
Even, if you remove the cases involving disability or orders to never serve on the
bench, White women still have a higher incidence of being forced to leave the bench

90

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 23.1

even as they are certainly less severely sanctioned (and consequently leave
the bench in lower numbers) than are women judges of color, particularly
Black women and Latinatjudges.243
One other note, although the number of cases that were dismissed or in
which no sanction was imposed is small (3.2%), Black judges (both women
and men) and Latina judges predominate. Are these cases more difficult to
prove? Are more of these cases frivolous? The numbers do not tell.
B. Charges
This section briefly turns to the number of misconduct charges or
findings filed against a judge in order to explore the relationship between
this and the severity of sanctions imposed generally, and specifically with
regard to women of color. The analysis reveals a measure of rationality in
the system even as the judicial disciplinary systems in place vary across
fifty different states.
This issue of charges is problematic in two ways.244 First, it is not clear
that a judge has been found guilty of all of the misconduct the state
commissions contend. A court, as in Judge Peebles case, may simply issue
an order stating that there was misconduct without specifying what conduct
put forward by the commission the Court found problematic. 245 While the
database records all of the charges listed, it is not clear if the sanction
imposed is intended to correct or condemn all of the misconduct listed, or if
some specific type of conduct dominated the state's determination. Further,
the practice of simply attaching a host of charges to an investigation,
sometimes engaged in by prosecutors, in hopes that one or more charges
than do White men but the difference is slight, 21.5 to 21.2
243. 23 .0% of White women judges as compared to 38.1% of Black women judges
and 42.1 % of Latina judges in this pool leave the bench pursuant to disciplinary action.
In addition, even if you combine tier one and two sanctions (suspension), Black women
and Latina judges are more severely sanctioned than are White women judges who
have the highest rates of suspensions among women. In combining these sanctions,
35% of White women either left the bench or were suspended, as compared to 42.9%
of Black women judges and 47.4% of Latina judges, the majority of which left the
bench.
244. Also, the data here is not as clean. For instance, a number of judges with two
charges kept coming up in the search for judges with a single charge.
245. Missouri Commission on Retirement, Removal and Discipline, RE: The Matter
of the Honorable Barbara Peebles: Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Recommendation [submitted to Supreme Court Aug 31, 2012, NO. SC9281 l (March 29,
2013J at 1-2 at
http://www.stltoday.com/commission-report-on-barbara-t
peebles/pdf_fe28ac3e-f3b7- l l e l -baca-00 la4bcf6878.htm
and
http://bloximages.newyork I. vip.townnews.com/stltoday.com/content/tncms/assets/v3/e
ditorial/f/e2/fe28ac3e-f3b7-l Ie l -baca-001a4bcf6878/504 l 35946ccc0.pdf.pdf
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"might stick" undermines any analysis that seeks to link the severity of
sanctions with the number and nature of the conduct.
Nevertheless, there were two hypotheses here. First, a single charge
would not result in the imposition of the harshest sanctions. Second, the
more charges attached to a judge's case, the more severe the sanction.
Regarding the first hypothesis, the database demonstrates, contrary to the
hypothesis, that a j udge charged and found to have engaged in a single type
of misconduct could be disciplined and severely disciplined. In fact more
than half the cases (745) represent a single charge, as Table 17 below
indicates. Simply finding that a judge engaged in a specific type of
misconduct resulting in a single descriptive charge or commission finding,
did not mean that there were not multiple instances of this misconduct or a
pattern of this type of conduct requiring chastisement. Further, the nature
of the conduct presumably has greater impact on the sanction
determination. At the same time, however, the data demonstrates (looking
across the rows in Table 22) that the severest sanctions represent a much
smaller percentage of the pool where a single conduct charged resulted in a
sanction.
Table 17246
Relationship between Number of C harges and Sanctions 247

G

H

I

8.3%
(62)

1 6.6%
( 124)

30%
(229)

1 3 .4%
( 1 00%)

1 1 .5%
(28)

1 9.8%
(48)

22%
(54)

1 0.7%
(26)

1 2.4%
( 1 6)

1 9.4%
(25)

20%
(26)

1 4.0%
( 1 8)

8.5%
(11)

1 7.4%
(8)

1 9. 5
(9)

6.5%
(3)

24%
( 1 01 )

1 3%
(6)

A

8

Charge I
(745 cases)

6%
(42)

1 1%
(82)

2 Charges
(242 cases)

1 2.3% 9.5%
(30)
(23)

3 Charges
( 129 cases)

1 6.3%
(2 1 )

4 Charges
(46 cases)

1 5%
(7)

E and F

246. Judicial Discipline Database , supra note 207.
247. Id.
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5 Charges
( 1 0 cases)

30%
(3)

2.4%
(2)

30%
(3)

1 0%
(1)

0%

0%

6 Charges
(8 cases)

50%
(4)

0%

12.5
(1)

25%
(2)

0%

0%

7 Charges
(6 cases)

50%
(3)

1 6.7%
(1)

0%

33%
(2)

Regarding the second hypothesis, the data revealed that the more charges
listed, the larger portion of the pool, the harsher sanctions claimed (looking
down the columns). This was particularly true for removals. The
percentage of resignations generally increased with additional charges up to
the point of four charges. Suspensions increased with additional charges
up to the point of five charges. This was so even though the pools became
smaller as the number of charges increased. After suspensions, including
censure, reprimand, and admonishment, the increase in charges showed
mix results.
Applying the insights provided by analyzing the number of charges to
the observations about cases involving women of color who incurred
severe tier one sanctions, a set of sixteen cases was revealed. With regard
to the number of charges filed these cases break down as follows:
• Seven cases in which only one type of conduct was reported.
However, in two cases the conduct was undisclosed.
• Five cases in which two types of conduct were charged and
presumably stuck.
• One case with three charges.
• Three cases in which four or more charges were levied .
The table demonstrates, a person can incur a tier one sanction on a single
charge of misconduct, although the chances are small (6%). Thus, the
imposition of tier one sanctions, based on the single criterion of one type of
conduct is completely plausible. This says nothing about the type of
misconduct for which these women were charged or whether there were
multiple instances of this conduct. Furthermore, not much can be
concluded given the small numbers of the pool. However, it is interesting
that of the twenty-seven women of color who had a single charge
representing one type of conduct, at least five (excluding the undisclosed
conduct of two) or 18% of them incurred tier one sanctions.
Two or more charges substantially increase the chances that a tier one
sanction might be imposed. Therefore, on this criterion alone, the
sanctions imposed on these cases are facially plausible, even as they
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contribute to disparities between people of color and Whites, and are
masked in the disparities between female and male judges.
Still, presumably, sanctions tum less on the number of alleged charges
and findings than on the type of misconduct in which the individual
engaged. By focusing on those cases where a single charge or type of
misconduct was listed, it became possible to identify some types of conduct
that frequently end in one type of sanction or another.
When the database was reduced to those cases involving a single charge,
the largest category in the database, and then further limited by the type of
sanction imposed, two fairly intuitive insights became clear. First, when
the sanction of removal (A) was searched within the single charge
subgroup, criminal conduct was the most prevalent or most repeated
conduct sanctioned by removal. Although a host of different types of
conduct result in removal of a judge from the bench, criminal conduct was
the leading cause for removal. Similarly, when limiting the search to
judges with one charge and who then resigned (B), the conduct most
repeated and thus the leading cause of resignation was failure to meet
educational requirements. The definitiveness of these searches becomes
murkier as the sanctions become less severe and more of an all-purpose
tool to express disapproval.248 Nevertheless, a brief analysis of this sort
might provide more information as to why a particular set of cases, those
involving severely sanctioned women of color, might have incurred a
particular set of sanctions.
C. Sanctioned Conduct

The most important factor in determining a sanction for misconduct is
the nature of the conduct. Murder in the criminal cont'ext often gamers a
harsher sanction than does assault. This section is meant to briefly explore
some of the conduct that tended to lead to particular types of sanctions and
may aid in explaining the high incidence of tier one sanctions occurring in
cases involving women of color.
This section only reviews those types of behavior that often lead to a
particular sanction. As such, it is incomplete. It is also incomplete because
the relationship between the sanction imposed and the behavior chastised in
cases involving the other groups (i.e. men of color, White women and men)
are not explored. However, it may provide some further context for
understanding the sanctions imposed and thus the disparities between the
groups.
Table 18 below lists a selected group of sanctions and provides the
leading types of conduct for which the sanction was imposed and the
248. So for instance, a wide range of conduct incurred the sanction of reprimand.
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number of appearances for each conduct type. For instance, in the removal
("A") column, of the 745 cases where one charge representing a single type
of conduct was sanctioned, six percent or forty-two cases incurred removal.
One type of conduct, criminal conduct, was cited fourteen times, and was
the most repeated conduct that lead to removal. Although a host of
different types of adjudicated misconduct ended in removal, the types of
conduct that were most often repeated are identified. In this example,
"criminal" conduct, "failure to follow the law," and "miscellaneous"
reasons constituted the highest number of repeat players. There were
fourteen cases in which the single charge was for criminal conduct
resulting in removal. Failure to follow the law and miscellaneous reasons
were charged in three cases each, which resulted in removal.
Table 18249
Relationship between Sanction and Conduct 1
745 cases
total

A
Removal

Resignation

E/F
Suspension

H
G
Censure Reprimand

Percentage

6% (42)

1 1 % (82)

8.3% (62)

1 6.6%
( 1 24)

30.7%
(229)

1 3.4% ( 1 00)

Leading
Conduct
(No. of
appearances)

Criminal
Conduct
( 1 4);
Failure to
Follow
Law/
Abuse of
Discretion (3);
Misc. (3)

Educational
Failure ( 1 5);
Criminal
Conduct (9);
Admin.
Failure (7)

Off-bench
Personal;
(8)
Admin.
Failure
(7);
Criminal/
DWI (5)

Admin.
Failure
( 1 3);
Failure
to
Follow
Law
( 1 2);
Misc.
( 1 2);
Demea
nor ( 1 e1 )
DWI
( I O)

Demeanor
/Partiality
(33);
DWI (27);
Failure to
Follow
Law (20);
Delay and
Diligence
( 1 7);
Ex parte
( 1 4);
Admin.
Failure
( 1 4)

Demeanor
( 1 8);
Admin.
Failure (IO);
Failure to
Follow Law
(IO);
Seeking
Favorable
Treatment
(7);
Delay and
Diligence (6)

B

249. Judicial Discipline Database, supra note 207.

I
Admonishment
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In analyzing this limited data, judges were not removed for certain types
of misconduct; including drinking while intoxicated; delay or lack of
diligence with regard to court duties, and failure to cooperate with a
judicial disciplinary commission. See Appendix. It makes sense that
judges are not removed simply for failing to cooperate with the
commission, as the commission was likely investigating evidence of some
other conduct. This so even if commissioners become frustrated with
uncooperative judges. Nevertheless, six judges were sanctioned for this
conduct, but not removed. One wonders, however, where the line lies
between noncooperation and the right to a zealous defense.
However, while there are types of misconduct for which only one or two
judges were removed, there are two types of conduct for which the only
judges removed were judges of color. These included removals for
inappropriate demeanor or comments, and administrative failure. See
Appendix. All three removals involved Black judges (two of the three
were removed for administrative failure). Still, judges have been removed
for almost every type of misconduct. The same holds true for resignations.
Regarding suspensions, personal misconduct and administrative failure are
both repeat players. Together, however, they account for only fifteen of the
sixty-two cases in this category.
Two types of conduct, in addition to failing to cooperate with the
commission, stand out for their broadness and the number of cases of
which they are a part. These types of conduct are demeanor, found in 220
cases, and administrative failure, found in 147 cases. This may mean that
many judges engage in these types of behavior. However, it may also
mean that the conduct is so broad that it captures a wide range of behaviors,
which when so captured, simply result in this conduct being added to other
charges. However, with regard to administrative failure, it also appears in
cases across the sanction spectrum, from resignation to admonishment.
Thus, it is likely a significant concern; though except for egregious cases,
the most common and perhaps the most appropriate sanction seems to be
censure or reprimand.
In applying these few observations to the cases involving women of
color, recall there were sixteen cases of women judges of color that
incurred tier one sanctions. Of these, seven were sanctioned on a single
charge-two of which were undisclosed -and the rest had two or more
charges against them. While not much can be said given the numbers, four
cases stand out. Each aids in illustrating the points above or provide
additional information.
These cases involve the misconduct of
administrative failure, the failure to cooperate with the commission, and
failure to comply with education requirements.
The first notable case against a woman judge of color in which she was
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removed is a case in which the only misconduct sanctioned was
administrative failure.
Unless the failure was really egregious,
administrative failure without more does not appear to be grounds for
removal in the overwhelming majority of cases and jurisdictions captured
in this data. The same analysis applies to the misconduct of inappropriate
demeanor, for which the typical sanction is a reprimand. Yet this woman
of color judge was removed for this conduct. But see Appendix.
In the second case, the state presumably found that the judge had
engaged in two types of misconduct. These were administrative failure and
failure to cooperate with the judicial disciplinary commission. Here, it
appears that administrative failure was the substantive charge and the
motivating factor for the commission's investigation. Again, unless the
behavior was egregious, and perhaps even if it was, without more, the
charge does not appear to be grounds for removal. In addition, the judge
was uncooperative with the commission (or was she zealously defending
herself?). But there are no cases in which a judge who failed to cooperate
with the disciplinary commission was removed. Would two charges,
neither of which standing alone warrant removal, in fact warrant removal if
combined together? Apparently so, in this case.
The third case also involves two charges. This case involved the charge
of delay and diligence on the one hand and failure to cooperate with the
disciplinary commission on the other. No judge in this data set was
removed for the primary misconduct of lack of diligence or delay. And, as
before, no judge has been removed for failing to cooperate with the
commission. Would this failure of cooperation convert a reprimand or
admonishment level violation into a removable offense? Again, apparently
so.
Finally, the last case involves the failure to comply with educational
requirements. This case is raised to highlight another factor that must be
taken into account in assessing the appropriateness of sanctions. This
factor includes the particularities of different states. For instance, of the
sixteen cases involving women of color and for which there was a single
charge representing a single type of conduct, three are from Texas. One
involves educational requirements and the judge resigned. This type of
conduct often leads to resignation. Almost all of the resignations reported
in the chart above on this issue, come from Texas. Texas had 119
disciplinary actions against judges in the period studied. Of those, thirty
nine have resulted in resignation (32.8%); apparently one of the sanctions
of choice in Texas. However, a sizable group of those sanctioned in Texas
are justices of the peace, some of whom are non-lawyers. A peculiarity of
Texas and a few other states, this reminds that the particularities of states
are an important factor in evaluating sanctions. As such, this particular
case of a woman judge of color does not stand out, at least on the numbers.
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In the end, I do not believe that cases can be decided or justice done on
the numbers. But perhaps numbers can be used in service of justice.
VI. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND OBSERVATIONS
This section is intended to summarize the major findings and
observations gleaned from assembling the case summaries documenting
judicial misconduct cases for the years 2002-2012 into a database. The
database contains 1263 entries representing 1263 judges, against whom
state judicial disciplinary proceedings were instituted. Of the 1263 judges
involved in disciplinary proceedings, the cases of forty judges were either
dismissed or no sanction was imposed. There are 120 cases that ended in
removal.
This is a preliminary study on disparities in the prosecution and sanction
of judicial misconduct cases. As such, its findings and observations will
benefit from further analysis, testing, challenge, and debate. In this regard,
the author is happy to make the database available for further study. The
study's major findings, based on 2010 data, and observations are listed
below.
Findings:
National Composition ofState Bench
•The State Bench is still dominated by White judges, at 91. 7%.250
•The State Bench is still dominated by men, at 73%.251
•The State Judicial Bench is still dominated by White men, at 67.9%.252
•Women judges represent 27% of the State Bench. Their numbers have
increased every year since The America Bench has kept records (even in
2012 when the number ofjudges on the State Bench decreased slightly).253
•Judges of color (JoC) represent 8.3% of those on the State Bench. Their
numbers have likely declined over the past decade.254
Judicial Misconduct Actions
Incident of Discipline Relative to Bench Presence
•JoC have a higher incidence of disciplinary actions instituted against them,
at 10.3%, than do White judges, at 7.0%.255
•Men have a higher incidence of disciplinary actions at 8.0%, than do
250. Table 3, supra note 1 68.
2 5 1 . Table 2, supra note 1 59; Table 4, supra note 1 68.
252. Table 5, supra note 1 70.
253. Table 2, supra note 1 59.
254. Table 3, supra note 1 68.
255. Table 7, supra note 209.
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women, at 5.2%256
•Men of color (MoC) have the highest incidence of discipline at 11.6%.2 57
•Though women judges overall have low incidents of discipline relative to
their presence on the bench, women of color (Woe) have a high incidence
of discipline at 8.2%.258
•Woe's incidence of disciplinary action is higher than that of White
women at 4.8%, White men at 7.8%, but lower than those of men of color
25
at 11.6%. 9
Removal and Resignations Relative to Incidence of Disciplinary Action
•Woe have the highest level of removal from the bench at 17.8%.260
■ Joe have a higher incidence of removal from the bench, at 12.8%, than do
White judges at 9.1%.261
•Woe removal rates contribute significantly to the high incidence of
removals of Joe, and thus the disparities between Joe and White judges.262
•Woe have the highest incidence of recorded resignations, at 17 .8%.263
•Women have higher incidence of resignations, 15.5%, than judges who are
4
men, at 11%.26
•White judges have a higher incidence of resignations at 12.2%, than do
Joe, at 9.5%, 265 and White male judges have a higher incident of
resignations, at 11.6% than do male judges of color at 5.8%.266
■ Overall, women judges,
including Black women, Latina, and White
women judges, leave the bench, pursuant to disciplinary action, at a higher
rate than do men.267
Dismissals or No Sanction Imposed
•Women have a higher incidence of dismissals or cases m which no
sanction was imposed, at 4.9% than do men, at 2.8%.2 68
256. Table 9, supra note 2 1 3 ..
257. Table 10 supra note 2 1 4 ..
258. ld.
259. ld.
260. ld.
26 1 .Table 7, supra note 209.
262. Table 1 0, supra note 2 1 4; Table 7, supra note 209. See also Table 1 1 , supra
note 224; Table 1 3 , supra note 226; Table 1 5, supra note 234 ..
263. Table 1 5, supra note 233.
264. Id.; Table 13, supra note 226.
265. Table 1 1 , supra note 224.
266. Table 1 3, supra note 226.
267. Table 1 6, supra note 236.
268. Table 1 3 , supra note 226; Table 1 5, supra note 233.
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•JoC have a higher incidence of dismissals or cases in which no sanction
was imposed, at 4.7%, than do White judges, at 3.0%. 269
Observations:
Incident of Discipline, Removals and Sanctions
•Black women judges have the highest incidence of removal, at 33.3%.270
•Latina judges have the highest incidence of resignations, at 36.8. 271
•Black male Judges have the highest incidence of suspension, at 18%,
followed by White women judges, at 12.0%.272
•Latina/o judges have the highest incidence of discipline at 15.9%,
followed by Black judges at 9.2%.273
Charges and Types of Misconduct
•The number of charges of misconduct have an impact on the severity of a
sanction, particularly with regard to removals and resignations. 274
•Cases in which a judge was involved in criminal conduct is one of the
most consistent types of misconduct leading to removal, although almost
every type of conduct or combination could lead to removal. 275 (No
criminal cases resulting in removal involved women judges of color).
•Failure to comply with education requirements is one of the most
consistent types of misconduct leading to resignations, however almost any
type of conduct or combination could lead to a resignation. 276
VIL CONCLUSIONS : SOME PERSONAL THOUGHTS
Two years ago I learned about the three cases that began this article. I
learned about Judge Peebles' case first. The judicial commission
prosecuting her case was recommending that she be removed. Now, I wil l
admit that I was not exactly disinterested but I was confused and startled
enough to look into the case with a relatively open mind. When I did, and
learned a bit of the background, I became convinced, that assuming the
majority of the charges were true, that the conduct did not warrant removal.
The penalty recommended seemed disproportionate to the misconduct
alleged. Evidently the Supreme Court of Missouri agreed. But even they, I
269. Table 1 1 , supra note 224.
270. Table 1 5, supra note 233 ..
27 1 . Id.
272. Table 14, supra note 229 ..
273. Table 8, supra note 2 1 0.
274. Table 1 7, supra note 246.
275. Table 1 8, supra note 2490.
276. Id.
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believe, went too far.
Months later, I was attending a conference where a colleague from the
West Coast began complaining about a hotly contested judicial election
involving another woman judge of color. I wondered: Is this a
phenomenon, a pattern into which I should look? A little research,
motivated by curiosity more than anything else, led me to the New Jersey
disciplinary case involving a Black male judge. And, the game was on.
I thought this would be a short little piece; after all, it was not on my
research agenda.
Further, I thought the research would be fairly easy. It was not. In fact,
the data, which I had assumed would be widely and easily available,
scarcely existed; and when it did, it was not in any updated, comprehensive
or comprehensible form. I guess, to my surprise, all the diversity talk out
there had really seeped into my consciousness. This talk suggests, on the
one hand, that our society values, respects, and embraces all of its people
and is open to exploring the different experiences, cultures and historically
and contextually shaped knowledge, ideas and perspectives we, as a
society, embody. On the other hand, it suggests that our society includes
all of its people -all of us - in its institutions and in access to resources and
opportunities, no matter our differences across race, ethnicity, gender,
sexuality etc. As these ideas are contrary to our long-lived historical
practices, diversity talk suggests that we are actively pursuing these goals.
I was surprised by my own shock.
Generally, when I hear some CEO, university administrator or others
talk about their commitment to "diversity," and "inclusion," etc., and then
look around at their institutions, my response is a barely audible
"Mhummm," - my version of the proverbial rolling of one's eyes or in the
vernacular of my kids, saying, "Yeah right." That is, most diversity talk
strikes me as just that: Talk; a rhetoric that is supposed to make the speaker
or institution look good. Few people - even some of us who are fully
committed to it - want to do the hard complicated work of making diversity
real, of changing the landscape including public policies, institutional
priorities, social operations and arrangements and economic incentives in a
way that would allow anyone and everyone, who so wanted and was
willing to work for it, to become a judge or anything else.
Yet, I was even more surprised by some of the civilized polite hostility
my various requests for information generated. Nothing, in my mind,
could be more innocuous than an academic calling "professionals" and
asking for demographic information about a particular state's judicial
bench. But few, responding to my requests, seemed to share my
perspective. Rather their various reactions seemed to range from a
suppressed notion of we will not help this '"Negress" who is trying to stir

2014]

DISPARITY IN JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT CASES

1 01

up trouble and disrupt our "traditional way of life," - a way of life built on
the subordination of others - to, "we do not appreciate people digging
around in matters that might expose White privilege," and finally, to those
who seemed to say, "we do not talk about race in polite company."
Gender, for whatever reason did not evoke the same kind of discomfort,
which may be why the American Bench directory provides a gender
progress report but not a racial/ethnic progress report. Nonetheless, the
latter group of responders struck me as "colorblind struck," and the others
gave me the impression that they had something to hide.
The "colorblind struck" folks, it seems to me, are concerned about the
harms they think that race-talk engenders, including those to human
dignity, those of reinforcing socially constructed illusory distinctions
between people and of balkanizing groups. But they seem blind or simply
indifferent to the vast costs mainstream colorblindness inflicts - the deep
reactionary work it does, when employed, in hiding, freezing in place and
projecting into the future the status quo of vast inequalities and limited
freedom for some as a result of continuing privilege for others based on
skin color - that they pretend to not see. As to the others, what, could those
others to whom my inquiries were directed, possibly have or want to hide?
Perhaps, if they were trying to hide anything at all, they were trying to hide
the fact that White and male privilege continues to exist and likely
contributes to a host of damaging gender and racial disparities that
potentially extend to the judiciary.
Of course from my perspective, White and male domination and
privilege, as well as, disadvantages to women and people of color is our
collective reality; as is the reality of deeply embedded bias, racism and
sexism, among others, in our institutions, systems and psyches. Thus, as
this is obvious at least to me, racial and gender oppression is no secret and
we need to stop trying to hide, mystify, cheat and lie about it. The only
questions are, what are we doing about them and will we pass this on to yet
another generation of our people, as was done to us? Because, again, from
my perspective, if colorblindness, as suggested above, is a charade and
diversity is, by half measure, a farce, then the practice of "colorblind
diversity," given where we truly are, is both an absurdity and a tragedy,
which in the long run will be clear, not hidden.
As for disparities, if they exist in this context, this would not really be
news. Disparities in general, including gender and racial disparities are
ubiquitous in this, and perhaps most, societies. Some disparities we can
easily explain. Some of the disparities are the result of processes that we
think are fair; others not. And, some we cannot explain. In this context, if
gender and racial disparities exist, as I suggests they do, they may be
explainable in terms of the conduct in which these judges engaged, the
number of charges they faced, the particular state rules that governed them,
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etc. If that were it, this would be curious but acceptable. Curious, because,
as my comments above indicate, unlike the Supreme Court, given our
history and present realities, I would flip the presumption (perhaps this is
un-lawyerly) and assume racism (bias, animus, strategic and structural
racism - as well as sexism) influences these processes, unless otherwise
demonstrated. And unlike Justice Powell, who thought he could, and we
should do nothing about "societal discrimination,"277 I think the rest of us
can and should. But in any event, as this is a first pass, a preliminary study
with several small data sets, I am perfectly open to credible research that
suggests otherwise.
So, after months of research, inquiries and the work of actually
constructing the database, what did this study find? It found disparities. It
found disparities in the incidence of discipline and in the severity of
sanctions. Specifically, relative to their presence on the state bench, men
are more disciplined than are women judges. Judges of color are more
often disciplined than are White judges. Judges of color who are men have
the highest incident of discipline, relative to their presence on the bench.
And women judges generally are disciplined less often than are male
judges, though not necessarily less severely. That is-except for women
judges of color. Women judges of color, not only have a higher incidence
of discipline - relative to their presence on the bench, than do White men
and White women, but they are also the most harshly sanctioned relative to
their presence in the disciplinary pool. In other words, women judges of
277. Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267, 276 ( 1 986) (striking
down a collective bargaining agreement that abridged a seniority plan and
provided heightened protection for Black teachers, who presumably would have
been the first fired because they were the last hired). Justice Powell was quoted as
saying:
Societal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis for
imposing a racially classified remedy. . . No one doubts there has been
serious racial discrimination in this country. But as the basis for imposing
discriminatory legal remedies that work against innocent people, societal
discrimination is insufficient and over-expansive.
Innocence is relative. And, as I noted elsewhere in roughly the same form:
Apparently it is acceptable for Black people and other Non Whites [including our
children] to suffer the costs of societal discrimination operating to their detriment
and to the unjust benefit of Whites, but inappropriate and over-expansive for
Whites to bear any costs in eliminating this same societal discrimination in which
they are often complicit and which primarily and inappropriately privileges them.
Athena D. Mutua, The Rise, Development, and Future Directions of Critical Race
Theory," 84 DEN. U. LAW REVIEW 329,t366 (2006).
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color are sanctioned more severely for misconduct than are male judges of
color, White women and White men. News? Valid? I leave this
determination to interested others to further explore.
APPENDIX
EXAMPLES OF CONDUCT AND SANCTIONS

Administrative Failure; Inappropriate Delegation of Authority; and
Staff issues
- 2 Removals (both Black judges).
- 8 Resignations.
- Most common sanction for this conduct is censure and reprimand.
- In two cases, no sanction imposed ( 1 Latina).
(But see, Gray, supra notel 76, explaining that 8 of 110 removals
between 1990-2001involved neglect or improper performance of
administrative duties, many involving failure to remit funds.)
Attempting to Obtain Favorable Treatment; Off-Bench Use of Prestige
of Office
2 Removed
2 Resigned
Most common sanction was either a censure or reprimand
Criminal Conduct
23 Removals or resignations.
Other sanctions included censure, reprimand, and admonishment.
Some states require that judges be removed when they have been
convicted of a crime.
Of the 57 judges sanctioned for criminal conduct, two were judges
of color, one resigned, the other suspended
Delay and Diligence
0 Removals.
4 Resigned.
3 Suspended.
Most common sanction is reprimand
6 people of color sanctioned.
Demeanor, Partiality; Comments on the Bench
1 Removed (Black male judge).
5 Resigned.
Most common sanction is reprimand.
(But see Gray, supra note 176 at 10-11, noting that 10 judges of
110 were removed for demeanor related findings)
Drinking while intoxicated (DWI)
0 Removed.
2 Resignations.
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Most common sanction is reprimand.
Four people of color sanctioned.
Ex Parte Communications
2 Removals.
0 Resignations.
Most common sanction was reprimand.
Failure to Comply with Educational Requirements
1 Removal.
16 Resignations.
25 of these cases came from Texas, many regarding justices of the
peace (other states included Louisiana, New York, Utah and South
Carolina.
Failure to Cooperate with Commission; Lying to Commission; Asking
Witnesses to Lie; Retaliating against Complainant (6/60)
0 Removals.
2 Resignations (both in Massachusetts).
Only 6 people engaged in this conduct for which a sanction
imposed. However, this conduct is among other conduct in 60
other cases. Where there are two or more charges, some 21 people
have been removed-a full third of this pool-of which eight were
people of color (seven were Black, one was a Latina).
Additionally, another 8 people were asked to resign. One of the 8
was Latina.
(See Gray, Supra note 176 at 67, noting that behavior during
investigation often is an aggravating factor or separate charge of
misconduct and in some cases "appeared to be a decisive factor
leading to a judge's removal.")
Failure to Follow the Law; Legal Error; and, Abuse of Discretion
3 Removals; one of which was a Latina/o Latina j udge.
3 Resignations.
Most common sanction is reprimand followed by a censure and
admonishment.
8 people of color sanctioned for this conduct, though not
necessarily removed.
On-Bench Abuse of Power
2 Removed (1 Latina)
3 Resignations.
1 Suspended (Latina)
Most common sanction was reprimand.
Personal Conduct (conduct related to off-bench activity)
1 Removed.
3 Resigned (1 Latina).
8 Suspensions.
- . Most common sanction was a reprimand.
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When allegations around personal conduct have been among other
charges, the rate of removals and other tough sanctions increase
incredibly.

